University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2-28-2012

Parallel Contract
Aditi Bagchi
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Contracts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons,
and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Repository Citation
Bagchi, Aditi, "Parallel Contract" (2012). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 396.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/396

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Parallel Contract
Aditi Bagchi1
This Article describes a new model of contract. In parallel contract, one party enters
into a series of contracts with many similarly situated individuals on background
terms that are presumptively identical. Parallel contracts depart from the classical
model of contract in two fundamental ways. First, obligations are not robustly dyadic
in that they are neither tailored to the two parties to a given agreement nor understood
by those parties by way of communications with each other. Second, obligations are
not fixed at a discrete moment of contract. Parallel contracts should be interpreted
differently than agreements more consistent with the classic model; in particular, the
obligations of the repeat contractor should be understood by reference to its most
recent practices and communications with any of the other parties in a given setting.
The second part of this paper excavates the deep reasons why some theories of
contract resist distinct models of contract. I propose a typology of contract theory that
roughly tracks John Rawls’ distinctions between pure, perfect and imperfect theories
of procedural justice. Pure and perfect theories of contract will tend to justify the
rules by which we identify and enforce contractual obligation based on general
features of contract; hence those rules will be deemed appropriate across contractual
settings. Theories of contract which regard contract as an imperfect means by which
parties manage exchange are more likely to endorse specialized rules, such as those
appropriate to parallel contract.
All contracts are incomplete2 and most contracts are not fully negotiated; few terms
are negotiated at all.3 Parties to contract are often dimly aware of the content of their rights
and obligations under an agreement at the moment of its formation.4

They come to
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See Amy Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Drafting Arbitration Reforms, 15
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 158 (2010) (reporting survey results that most consumers “never” or “rarely” try to
negotiate terms in consumer contracts).
4
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understand that content through communications received after contract, and with individuals
who are not party to the agreement. These well-known facts about the typical contractual
process are nevertheless alarming because they remain at odds with the classical picture of
contract which continues to motivate our reasoning about the sources of contractual
obligation and the best methods of contract interpretation.
In the classical account, individuals negotiate agreements that impose discrete
performance obligations on each party, in an exchange which each understands to be in its
respective best interest.5 Consent creates contractual obligations where there were none
before, and only after the process of negotiation and evaluation is complete. No obligations
precede the moment of mutual consent and the obligations fixed by contracts are not revised
unless and until there is a comparable moment of self-conscious consent to modification.
The concepts of contracts of adhesion and relational contract have each attempted to
correct the classical picture.6 Contracts of adhesion are take-it-or-leave it contracts which
one side has no opportunity to negotiate.7 Usually, that party is also unfamiliar with many

planning, or only a minimal amount of it, especially concerning legal sanctions and the effect of defective
performances. As a result, the opportunity for good faith disputes during the life of the exchange relationship
often is present.”); Randy Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of
Contract, 78 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1175, 1203 (1992) (acknowledging that “[t]here is no magic moment of
contractual conception at which time every right and obligation of contracting parties is unambiguously
expressed”).
5

See P.S. Atiyah, Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L. Q. REV. 193, 194-95 (1978)
(describing, and critiquing as antiquated, the “paradigm of modern contract” as a “bilateral executory
agreement” consisting of “an exchange of promises” that is “deliberately carried through, by the process of offer
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See Joseph M. Perillo, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.3, at 5 (6th ed. 2009) (“[C]ontracts of
‘adhesion’ ... constitute a serious challenge to much of contract theory.”); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment
of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L.
REV. 854 (1978) (describing relational contract paradigm as better fit for long-term contracts).
7
See E. Allen Farnsworth, CONTRACTS §4.26, at 286 (4th ed. 2004); Kortum-Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL,
204 P.3d 693, 698 (Mont. 2009) (“Contracts of adhesion arise when a party possessing superior bargaining
power presents a standardized form of agreement to a party whose choice remains either to accept or reject the
contract without the opportunity to negotiate its terms.”); Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1281
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contracts terms before formally consenting to them and may believe she holds rights against
the other party which she in fact waives under the contract.8 Often, that party has no practical
alternative to certain terms or contracts.9 The standard form contract between a company and
a single consumer is the product of a market consisting of many consumers, and consumers
navigate that market with information obtained primarily from other consumers.
Relational contracts are different.

The parties to a relational contract often have a

relationship prior to contract; at the least, their relationship extends beyond the terms of
contract.10 The relationship is of mutual dependence and this dependence motivates each
party’s behavior within the contractual arrangement.11 Contract terms are vague and openended; the conduct of the parties is a function of a dense network of background norms and it
is unclear which of those norms are intended to be legally binding.12 Neither the controlling
norms nor the boundaries of contract are spelled out at the time of contract or at any fixed
point in the relationship.
Contracts of adhesion and relational contracts are in some ways opposite to each
other, since the former envisions total anonymity and impersonality while the latter suggests
thick, detailed and tailored norms.13 Both have been important to showing a lack of fit
between standard contract doctrine and certain kinds of contract, including the typical
consumer contract, contracts between intimates, contracts embedded in certain closed
business communities and possibly employment contracts.

(9th Cir. 2006) (defining contract of adhesion as “a standardized contract, imposed upon the subscribing party
without an opportunity to negotiate the terms.”).
8
See Solan et al, supra note x, at 1297.
9
See Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 165 P.3d 328, 337 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (defining contract of adhesion as
one where consumer has no market alternatives).
10
See Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 345 (1983).
11
See Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1100-03 (1981).
12
Id. at 1091.
13
But see Ian Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5 (1984); Ethan Leib,
What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract? (2011).
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But those who wish to challenge the presumptions of (still) classical contract law have
relied too much on the ideas of contracts of adhesion and relational contract. These two
models do not cover the full expanse of the contractual landscape, even together with those
contracts to which the classical model does apply. Relational contract theory is also guilty of
sometimes claiming a universality that undermines the corrective quality of its critique of
classical contract theory.14 In this Article I identify another model of contract, parallel
contract. In settings characterized by parallel contract, one party enters into a series of
contracts with many similarly situated individuals on background terms that are
presumptively identical, but change over time.

This model of agreement is often

characteristic of employment agreements, landlord-tenant leases, sales contracts in
subdivisions or cooperatives, partnership agreements, franchise agreements and investor
agreements with managers or hedge funds.
Two presumptions about contract must be rejected in interpreting parallel contracts.
First, each contracting party assumes obligations to a particular other party by way of
communicative acts between those two parties. A corollary of this principle is that contracts
are tailored to their individual parties. These related presumptions are not fundamental to
contract (given rules of assignment, third party beneficiaries, and trade usage of terms) but
motivate interpretive rules that focus exclusively (or disproportionately) on communications
between contracting parties and facts relevant to what a court might expect those two parties
to have negotiated given their particular circumstances.
The second presumption of classical contract that must be rejected in cases of parallel
contract is that contract terms are simultaneously set at a single moment of contract. While
this view is not inconsistent with the recognized fact of contractual incompleteness, it tends
14

Relational theory can be taken to describe all contracts but to identify characteristics that are especially
important to some subset, which should be treated differently. See Ethan Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59
EMORY L.J. 649, 656 (2010) (discussing counterproductive nature of claim that all contracts are relational).
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to cause courts to fill in gaps at the designated moment of contract by assigning discretion to
one party, and then to impose high hurdles for modification.
The Article has two aims. First, I will introduce the concept of parallel contract and
explain how it captures an important model of contract that is separate from existing models.
Contracts of adhesion implicitly challenge the presumption of a dyadic structure to contract,
and relational contract challenges the presumption of a discrete moment of contract, but each
incorporates other assumptions that do not apply to parallel contract. In cases of parallel
contract, courts should interpret parties’ obligations by reference to practices that evolve
across an open set of parallel contracts.
Taking the case of parallel contract as illustrative, my second aim is to show more
generally that the process by which contracts are agreed upon and performed is highly
relevant to how they should be regulated and enforced.
There are three fundamentally different ways of viewing the contractual process,
which I will label pure, perfect and imperfect.

The view of contract one espouses has

implications for which agreement courts should enforce and how.15 In pure contract, a basic
principle such as autonomy or the value of promise justifies enforcement of contract and
shapes the rules of enforcement without regard to contractual outcomes. Case law continues
to use the rhetoric associated with pure contract. Scholars who view the contractual process
as perfect, such as many legal economists, believe that the process of contract formation,
including but not limited to the consent of the parties, gives rise to confidence that most
contracts are value-generating and leave both parties better off than prior to contract.
Finally, in a view of contract as imperfect (the view advanced here), contract is an
imperfect means by which parties attempt to regulate certain exchanges and relationships.
15

See Melvin Eisenberg, The Principle of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 640 (1982) (“A promise, as
such, is not legally enforceable. The first great question of contract law, therefore, is what kinds of promises
should be enforced.”).
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Whether a given contract warrants deference on grounds of autonomy or whether it should be
modified on welfarist or public policy grounds depends on context-specific considerations,
because no general feature of contract justifies any uniform mode of contract enforcement.
What we take to be the outcomes of a given contractual process depend on our priors
regarding the nature of contract. The terms of a legal agreement just are what contract law
recognizes as binding obligations, and the recognized terms determine in turn what
allocations ultimately flow from an agreement. If some highly general principle of consent or
prediction about efficiency consistently validates outcomes, a uniform law of contracts may
be justified irrespective of the particular interpretations and distributions that follow. But on
this view, in some contexts, the legal and material outcomes of contract are surprising for
contracting parties and unattractive to third parties. If an alternative set of interpretive rules
better fits the self-understanding of parties and generates superior outcomes – parallel
contract is intended as such an account -- we can work backwards to reject the universal
assumptions about contract law that would preclude it. Through a process of reflective
equilibrium16 we revise our meta-theory of contract to bring it in alignment with our
considered judgments about the best rules of contract for particular kinds of contract. We can
also reason in the reverse direction. Reasons for rejecting pure and perfect theories of
contract should motivate us to rethink our resistance to specialized rules of contract.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I describes the classical model of contract
formation and the challenges to that model by the literatures on contracts of adhesion and
relational contract. Part II introduces an alternative model, parallel contract, which captures
the process of contract formation and execution in certain settings. Part II also shows how
this alternative model of contract is appropriately governed by its own set of interpretive rules
and studies its most obvious application, employment in large firms. Part III rejects pure and
16

See John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42-45 (1971).
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perfect theories of contract as too dogmatic and argues instead that interpretive rules and the
models of contractual process on which they implicitly rely must be tailored to contractual
context. Part IV concludes.
I.

The Classical Model and its Existing Alternatives
In the classical account of contract, parties to contract negotiate their agreements.

Those agreements impose a specified set of performance obligations on each party, and the
obligations of each are carefully tailored such that the bargain could not be improved to their
mutual satisfaction. The parties meet each other in the marketplace moments before contract,
and they come with no standing obligations to the other.17 The obligations they assume are
not subject to modification unless the parties reenact the process of formation.18
Two basic ideas about contract and its normative foundations stem from this picture.
First, contracts are presumed to be robustly dyadic. One party makes an offer to a particular
other party, who may accept or decline. This offer-acceptance sequence that takes place
between two discrete individuals determines their respective obligations under the contract.

17

See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 630 (1943) (in the classic picture “[e]ither party is supposed to look out for his own interests and his
own protection. Oppressive bargains can be avoided by careful shopping around. Everyone has complete
freedom of choice with regard to his partner in contract, and the privity-of-contract principle respects the
exclusiveness of this choice. Since a contract is the result of the free bargaining of parties who are brought
together by the play of the market and how meet each other on a footing of social and approximate economic
equality, there is no danger that freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a whole.”); Melvin
Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (2000) (classical contract
law “was implicitly based on a paradigm of bargains made between strangers transacting on a perfect market”);
Victor Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 45, 49 (1976) (“The
paradigmatic contract of neoclassical economics…is a discrete transaction in which no duties exist between the
parties prior to the contract formation and in which the duties of the parties are determined at the formation
stage.”); Gordon, supra note x, at 569 (“In classical contract, individuals have no obligations to each other save
those created by the coercive rules of the state or their own promises.”). Cf. Daniel Friedman, The Performance
Interest in Contract Damages, 111 L. Q. REV. 628 (1995) (fundamental function of contract law is “the
recognition and the ordering of entitlements created by the parties’ binding promises”).
18
See Atiyah, supra note x, at 196 (“Contracts have a chronology, a time sequence…They are created first, and
performed (or not performed) thereafter.”); Eisenberg, supra note x, at 807 (“Classical contract law focused
almost exclusively on a single instant in time—the instant of contract formation—rather than on dynamic
processes such as the course of negotiation and the evolution of a contractual relationship.”).
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The contract does not reflect obligations that run between persons other than the two parties.
It does not inform the legal obligations or contractual behavior of either party with others.
Because of the presumption of dyadic relations, we tend to regard contracts as
effectively tailored to two parties, and intentionally designed or otherwise assured to
maximize their joint surplus.19 This confidence again derives from the process by which we
envision contracts to have come about, either direct negotiations or a selection mechanism
that culminates in one offeree accepting terms that another may have rejected. There is no
presumption that the transactional surplus is evenly divided, because the parties come to
contract with different alternatives and thus disparate bargaining power.20 But the contract is
the culmination of an efficient procedure: either an iterative market process by which an
offeror locates an offeree for whom the proposed terms are optimal, or actual negotiation by
which parties navigate respective preferences until they settle upon optimal terms. The
process is of the kind which ensures that in the normal case no Pareto-superior improvement
is possible.21
The second presumption of classical contract is that all contract terms are
simultaneously set at a single moment of contract.

While this view is not necessarily

inconsistent with a recognition that parties have not designed the contract with an eye toward
all contingencies, reconciling a commitment to a privileged moment of contract
(“obligational completeness”) with the fact of (“informational”) incompleteness causes courts
to sometimes fill in gaps by assigning discretion to one party where the contract is silent, and

19

See Lewis Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV.
683 (1985-86) (“The assumptions of rationality and utility maximization provide a theory of contract formation:
every clause must be ‘rational’ for each party. In negotiating over a particular contingency, each party will
evaluate the worth (or cost) to her of contract performance under that contingency. The promisor will demand
sufficient payment to cover her expected costs.”).
20
See Robert D. Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 78-80 (4th ed. 2003).
21
The story is idealized in that no contemporary commentator would deny that transaction costs render the
results of both negotiation and market sorting suboptimal from an allocative standpoint.
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to impose high hurdles for modification.22 The parol evidence rule too reflects the privileged
status of the state of agreement at a particular moment in time. But while the parol evidence
rule operates only in the case of written agreements, and excludes only some portion of
communications that precede the magic moment23, the primacy of what is said at the
contractual moment over what is subsequently said and done is more pervasive. What is said
or done after the contract is created does not usually speak to the parties’ obligations under
the given contract unless those words or events can be regarded as new moments of contract.
Contracts of adhesion and the scholarly and judicial effort to make sense of them have
already shown us that the presumption of dyadic relations is misleading.24 Similarly, the
concept of relational contract has emphasized the extent to which it may be arbitrary and
potentially distorting to privilege a static body of communications as reflective of an
agreement that evolves over the course of a contractual relationship.25 This Part considers in
greater detail how the classic model is represented in doctrine, and how contracts of adhesion
and the notion of relational contract have challenged the classic model. In the following Part,
I show how parallel contract is an instance where neither of the classic presumptions hold,
but which differs markedly from the models envisioned by contracts of adhesion and
relational contract.26
A. Classic model

22

See Robert Scott & George Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) (distinguishing “obligationally incomplete” contracts which “fail[] to describe the
obligations of the parties in each possible state of the world” from “informationally incomplete” contracts which
“fail[] to provide for the efficient set of obligations in each possible state of the world.”).
23

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981).
See infra Part I, Section 2.
25
See infra Part I, Section 3.
26
See infra Part II.
24
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Nobody takes the classical model of contract formation to be “true” in the sense of
descriptively accurate, but judges and scholars may take the two ideas about contract that
derive from that model to be normative if not descriptive truths. The two ideas animate core
doctrine, though the presumptions are also implicitly defeasible in light of more narrow
doctrines.
The presumption that contracts are dyadic is evidenced first in the rules of offer and
acceptance. Communications that are directed toward multiple individuals are less likely to
be treated as binding offers that create a power of acceptance.27 In the case of unilateral
contracts, specific notice of the offer by an individual offeree is necessary to accept through
performance.28 The offer does not create a general power of acceptance when conveyed to
the public in general; it only becomes an effective offer for any given individual when the
elements of offer and acceptance that one would contemplate in dyadic relations are present.
The presumption of dyadic relations is most important in the rules of contract
interpretation. Where a written document exists and its terms are unambiguous, there is
simply no occasion to look outside of it.29 When a document is ambiguous, the court inquires
what it was reasonable for each party to believe the other intended by her words and acts.

30

The question is not what it would be reasonable for each party to believe her rights and
obligations are under contract, should those differ from or simply cover more ground than her
best guess as to the other party’s state of mind. The words or acts of third parties or even of
the parties in relation to third parties is relevant only where it helps to establish the universal

27

See Lonergan v. Scolnick, 276 P.2d 8 (1954) (finding form letter distributed to many prospective buyers could
not be reasonably construed as offer).
28
See Glover v. Jewish War Veterans of United States, 68 A.2d 233 (1949) (notice of unilateral contract is
required to accept through performance).
29
See Bradley Real Estate Trust v. Dolan Assoc., Ld., 640 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1994).
30

See Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 309 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Eaton v. Smith, 37 Mass.
150, 154, 156 (1838).
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meaning of a word, or the usage of a word within a trade. What others have said or have
been told is important as evidence of the way words were used by the two parties to contract,
never as direct evidence of the content of contractual obligation. Where one party is aware of
the other’s subjective understanding of a term, that meaning controls.31 If there is reason to
believe that one party is unaware of trade usage, the trade meaning is not binding.32
The second presumption that flows from the classic model is that obligations are set,
even if not fully specified, at a discrete moment of contract. This presumption is fundamental
to black letter law. First, there is no duty to negotiate in good faith – until there is a contract,
there is no contract.33 Statements contemplating a bargain with a particular content are not
binding until there is evidence that the parties understood their agreement to be final – that is,
contractual. The very fact that negotiations are undertaken with the aim of concluding a
contract at a later point render commitments made in the course of the negotiations
unenforceable where they otherwise might be, e.g. under promissory estoppel (the anomalous
case of Red Owl notwithstanding).34
Second, the view of contract as a special moment is consistent with the doctrine of
consideration, which makes difficult both modification of contractual obligation and the
enforcement of additional commitments as free-standing promises.35 Although modification
is now possible without consideration, it is only enforceable where it is apparently motivated

31

See RESTATEMENT SECTION 201.
See Frantz v. Cantrell, 711 N.E.2d 856 (Ind.App. 1999) (trade usage not binding where a party was not and
ought not to have been aware of trade usage).
33
See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed
Negotiations, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 217, 239 (1987).
34
See 168th and Dodge, LP v. Rave Rev. Cinemas, LLC, 501 F.3d 945 (2007); cf. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
35
While I focus here on the legal impediments to adjusting a contractual relationship, perhaps in part because of
these hurdles, in practice adjustments are also unlikely to be self-consciously undertaken with the aim of
revising the legal agreement. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (“the creation of exchanges usually is far more contractual than the
adjustment of such relationships and the settlement of disputes.”).
32

11

by a desire to avoid losses threatened by new circumstances36; even new commitments that
are not prima facie revisions of earlier commitments are treated as revisions of a completed
bargain subject to these rules of modification.37 Nor is it usually possible to enforce
additional commitments made by one party to an agreement without reference to the previous
bargain. Under promissory estoppel, the very fact of that earlier bargain will make it difficult
to show that the promisee relied on the additional commitment, since reliance will often take
the form of conduct that overlaps substantially with the performance obligations of the
promisee under the original bargain.38 Moreover, commitments made by a party after a
contract has been formed that were contemplated by that agreement are not treated as further
specification of that party’s obligations but instead as exercise of discretion with respect to
the fulfillment of the unspecified obligation. The effect is that the party exercising discretion
retains the right to revise that commitment unilaterally at a later point so long as its later
position would have been consistent with the general obligation initially assumed.39
Finally, because contracts are incomplete with respect to the states of the world they
contemplate, courts’ insistence on the legal completeness of contracts leads them to construct
legal obligations solely on facts available to the parties “at the time of contract.” Thus, when
a negative contingency arises that substantially alters the value of the agreement for one of
the parties, courts cannot offer relief before asking whether it would be reasonable to assign
risk of the contingency to that party under the initial agreement.40 Where the scope of a

36

See RESTATEMENT SECTION 89; UCC 2-209 (Official Comment).
Distinguish, for example, a commitment to pay $200 instead of $100 for an item from a commitment to allow
time off for an employee without reducing compensation previously set by an employment agreement.
38
For example, if an employer promises an employee a holiday bonus where the employee already operates
under an employment contract, the employee may have difficulty showing that she relied on that promise given
that she was already obligated to work in the relevant period under the terms of the existing contract.
39 For example, an employer that assumes an obligation to provide health benefits might initially offer a
generous plan but then unilaterally substitute an inferior one. By contrast, if the initial offering were treated as a
specification of the obligation to provide benefits, once specified the obligation could not be unilaterally revised.
40
See RESTATEMENT SECTION 152. Cf. Atiyah, supra note x, at 217 (“Frequently, it is the interpretation of the
law which converts a simple postponed exchange into a risk-allocation exercise, rather than any deliberate intent
of the parties.”).
37
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party’s obligation is unclear and the court must provide a default rule, courts usually imagine
the term that the parties would have struck had they expressly bargained with respect to the
contingency in question at the time of formation41 – sometimes to the point of extending the
advantage of the more powerful party on the grounds that its bargaining power would have
informed bargaining on the hypothetical term.42 Defaults may be more or less tailored to the
parties, but they are never tailored to the parties as they are constituted at the moment of
dispute but rather to their situations at the time of contract formation.
The classical model of how contracts are formed thus has concrete implications for
how contracts are enforced. The claim here is not that these various doctrines are simply
ideological.43 For example, there are strong efficiency considerations that cut in favor of
many of these rules. But the force of those reasons, and our confidence in them, turns on the
background model of contract.44 For example, the benefits and costs which speak to the
breadth of evidence a court will entertain will vary depending on the availability of particular
kinds of evidence and the availability of various limiting principles. The benefits and costs of
imposing liability based on communications prior to or subsequent to formal execution of an
agreement will turn on how contracts are normally formed and how parties behave in the
course of performance. There is no straightforward way to deduce optimal rules from actual
behavior, but the former is nonetheless dependent on the latter. When we say that contract

41

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (describing tailored and untailored majoritarian default rules, but also introducing
concept of penalty default rules).
42
See Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules,109 COLUM. L. REV. 396 (2009)
(advocating default rules which reflect the balance of bargaining power at the time of contract).
43
In this important respect my claims differ from those of the critical legal studies movement with respect to
contract.
44
Cf. Avery Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L REV. 496,
498 (2004) (“for the past one hundred years or so the historical trend across the board has been to water down
such formal doctrines in favor of a more all-things-considered analysis of what the parties may have meant in
the individual case”).
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law presumes the classical model of contract formation, we mean that the normative appeal
(efficiency or otherwise) of various rules presumes that model.
Still, the presumptions which flow from that model are sometimes relaxed. We relax
the presumption of dyadic relations in several doctrines that are not commonly regarded as
central to contract law as a whole, including the rules of assignment, delegation and third
party beneficiaries. These doctrines are often excluded from first-year contracts courses. But
a presumption that most contracts are assignable and delegable does imply that the identity of
parties to contract is not sacred or essential to their bargain.45 The possibility of vesting
rights in third parties, though possible only where the parties themselves are deemed to have
intended to create such an enforceable interest, also admits that contractual relations are not
strictly dyadic.46
More important, contracts can be interpreted with reference to the world outside the
contractual relationship.

Trade usage is taken to inform how the parties themselves are

likely to have used terms in a written agreement.47 And where the parties fail to specify a
term like price, courts may presume that the parties intended to contract on terms that are in
line with the market in which they are situated.48
The second presumption, of legal completeness at formation, is also relaxed in the
doctrines of the duty of good faith, modification, changed circumstance, and in the
significance assigned to course of performance. The duty of good faith is interpreted to

45

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317, 318 (1981).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1981).
47
See § 1-303(c) (“A ‘usage of trade’ is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance
in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in
question.”); see, e.g., Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 731 (8th Cir. 1995).
48
See UCC § 2-305.
46
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restrict the parties’ ability to usurp opportunities they bargained away at contract formation49;
but it does allow courts to disallow specific conduct that was not addressed with particularity
in the initial agreement.50 Although the restrictive character of the rules of modification
ultimately reinforce the picture of a complete legal bargain at formation, they do at least
allow parties to revise that bargain where they expressly undertake to do so.51 Where
circumstances are sufficiently changed – where they rise to the level of impossibility or
impracticability – parties may be excused from performance altogether.52 Avoidance of an
obligation under changed circumstance depends on a finding that the parties did not
contemplate the negative contingency that materialized, and in that sense acknowledges the
reality that the terms of the agreement do not cover the infinite expanse of possible events.
Finally, courts allow ex post course of performance to inform interpretation of
ambiguous terms53 and also to inform validity of a contract where there is doubt on grounds
of indefiniteness.54 Actual conduct can also result in constructive waiver of even express
conditions.55 In the doctrines relating to course of performance and waiver, courts are most
clearly prepared to abandon the fiction that all rights and obligations are fixed at the time the
contractual relationship is initiated.

But these are relevant only where the underlying

agreement is ambiguous or where there is inconsistency between the parties’ actual and
contemplated conduct.

49

See Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.d 187 (1989) (citing Burton, Breach of Contract and the
Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369 (1980).
50
The more incomplete an agreement, the larger the role played by the duty of good faith. Cf. Richard Speidel,
The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 823, 846 (2000)
(advocating expansion of duty of good faith to help parties maintain long-term relational contracts).
51
See UCC § 2-209; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 89.
52
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) §§ 261-66.
53
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 202(4-5); UCC § 2-208 .
54
See UCC § 2-208.
55
See Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1 (N.Y. 1908).
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The two presumptions I am imputing to classical contract law are not dogmatic, as the
above discussion shows.56 They are presumptions rather than assumptions because they are
defeasible. Moreover, the presumptions serve a number of useful purposes in many contexts.
The contention here is neither that they have been arbitrarily adopted nor that they are
categorically false.

The point is instead that the utility of the presumptions, and the

appropriate conditions required for rejecting them, depend on contingent aspects of the
contractual process.
B. Contracts of Adhesion
The term “contracts of adhesion” describes a real-world phenomenon; it is neither an
idealized model of contract formation nor a theory of contract intended to illuminate
contractual practices generally. But the model of contract it describes is so radically at odds
with the classical model that it both exposes that model as idealized (or at least, unreal) and
throws into relief even those contracts which it does not describe directly.
Contracts of adhesion are standard form agreements drafted by one party who uses
that form in numerous transactions.57 The “adhering” party not only cannot negotiate but
usually has not read or understood many of the terms on the standard form.58 Often no other
terms are available on the market. Consumer assent to these transactions is not voluntary in
the robust sense that voluntariness is pictured in the classic model of contract.59

56

Contract theory premised on the classic model is far more dogmatic than doctrine. See Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Common Law (describing the course of law as essentially pragmatic); see also supra Part III
(discussing pure theories of contract).
57
Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: an Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV L REV. 1173, 1177 (1983)
(describing seven characteristics of contracts of adhesion).
58
Id. at 1179.
59
See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2006) (“The idea of voluntary willingness first decayed into consent, then into assent, then
into the mere possibility or opportunity for assent, then to merely fictional assent, then to mere efficient
rearrangement of entitlements without any consent or assent.”); Rakoff, supra note x, at 1180 (“Because
contract law is rationalized in large part on the voluntary assumption of obligation – or on the reasonable
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Of course, courts could have simply declined to enforce standard form contracts as
legally binding in light of their departure from the ideal process of contract formation.60 But
contracts of adhesion are never denied enforceability altogether. Courts sometimes do refuse
enforcement of particular terms; more often, they either enforce them as written or enforce
them within bounds.61 This is because the idealized process from which standard form
contracting departs is not only a fiction, it is not even properly taken as an ideal. The absence
of meaningful assent by consumers to standard form contracts is problematic because we are
not prepared to do without these contracts, or to correct even those features most at odds with
the classic model and its vision of fully voluntary (and informed) assumption of obligation.62
Instead, courts have been generally prepared to treat consumers’ willingness to transact on
the basis of a standard form agreement as consent to all the terms within those agreements.63
Although the focus of the literature on contracts of adhesion has been on the difficulty
of establishing consent to contract by the consumer, mass contracts challenge the classic

appearance thereof --- it cannot be applied in an automatic and straightforward manner to contracts of
adhesion”).
60
See Rakoff , supra note x, at1284 (“Contract law is inherently based on broad generalization about how
social units interact with each other, and about what institutional forces control these interactions. When
applied to the typical circumstances in which contracts of adhesion are used, the generalizations incorporated in
ordinary law are far removed from the forces that actually define how the parties are situated.”).
61
See Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939) (“where bargaining is absent in fact, the
conditions and clauses to be read into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread paper,
but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on that paper.”); Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing
Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN L REV. 869, 70 (2011) (courts often substitute a minimally tolerable terms for an
unacceptable one).
62
See Douglas Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 939 (2006) (“Hidden product attributes
over which sellers given potential buyers no choice are a commonplace, necessary, and entirely unobjectionable
feature of mass markets.”). Many scholars have defended terms which initially came under attack as actually
beneficial to consumers. See Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970)(even unfavorable warranty terms may provide information to consumers
about the liability of products); George Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L J 1297,
1298 (1981) (viewing warranties as “contract that optimizes the productive services of goods by allocating
responsibility between a manufacturer and consumer for investments to prolong the useful life of a product and
to insure against productive losses”).
63
See Karl Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (suggesting that adhering party can be understood to
give “blanket assent (not specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his
form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms”).
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model on another dimension as well: the dyadic character of the contractual relation.64 There
is nothing importantly binary about the relationship between parties to a standard form
agreement.

In fact, standard form contracts make the identity of at least one party to the

contract (consumer) entirely irrelevant; often, it is never revealed to the other. The identity of
even the drafting corporation may be of limited relevance to the process of contract formation
– and by implication, to deciphering the meaning of terms -- where the form is standardized
across an industry, or where certain clauses or terms are used across markets for very
different goods and services.65
Standard form contracts are in every meaningful way products of the mass markets in
which they appear.

They reflect the market behavior of many individuals.

Individual

consumer understanding of them depends entirely on their prior experience in that market, as
well as their direct communications with other consumers. Contracts of adhesion are at once
recognizable as contract but grossly inconsistent with the classic model of contract. The
result is to demonstrate concretely the contingency and limited applicability of the classic
model. In particular, it reveals as implausible the presumption that communications between
parties to a contract are always important to the content of their agreement and the primary
basis of their respective understandings as to that content.
C. Relational Contract
If contracts of adhesion have made salient the porous personal boundaries of contract,
relational contract theory has highlighted the artificial character of the temporal boundaries of
64

Cf. Baird, supra note x, at 951 (“Much of the view of the problem is a view of the law that reduces everything
to rights that A and B have against each other. From here, it is but a short step to view any troublesome
transaction in which there is boilerplate to be the result of boilerplate and the absence of a fully dickered bargain
between two equals.”).
65
See Mark Patterson, Standardization of Standard Form Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications, 52
WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 327 (2010) (discussing anticompetitive concerns raised by coordinated
standardization by competitors); Robert Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94
NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 847, 860 (2000) (“Over time…the stock of standardized terms and conventions that
have been tested by judicial interpretation in contract disputes will increase.”).
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contract. The language of a “meeting of the minds” has been dismissed as implying a
subjective test of assent to contract. But the picture of minds connecting has had a lasting
effect. If we now see that the meeting of minds is too high an aspiration (and not the morally
relevant standard), the concept itself acknowledged the improbability of subjective agreement
by modestly limiting the expectation of such agreement to a passing moment. If minds can
meet, they will not engage for more than a moment. We continue to speak of that contractual
moment though the modern language of reasonable inference does not require it. In fact, as
relational theory emphasizes, parties’ reasonable understandings and expectations of each
other are developed over time, over a period that begins well before the finalizing of an
agreement and that extends through the course of performance.
Relational contract theory rejects several assumptions in the classical model, and its
primary claim could be taken to be its characterization of the contractual relationship as a
meaningful relation subject to a rich array of thick norms that are not reflected in any
document or even the parties’ conscious understanding of their legal obligations. One of the
founders of relational theory, Ian Macneil, defines relational theory to hold that “every
transaction is embedded in complex relations” and requires “understanding all essential
elements of its enveloping relations.”66 Although complex relations need not be positive or
worthy of either deference or support, the relational picture of contract is sometimes a rather
rosy one. Relationalists tend to emphasize the ways in which parties intend to cooperate with
one another, even maximizing joint rather than individual utility.67 They tend to view the
norms governing relationships as jointly produced and symmetrically applied.

66

Ian Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 877, 881
(2000).
67
See David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-term Contractual Relationships: the role of Cooperation, 20 J. of L. & Soc. 166, 167 (1993). Macneil views contracts as characterized by interdependence,
supra note x, at 1032-33, that amounts to solidarity. Id. at 1034. “The most important aspect of solidarity [for
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In calling for contract law to attend to the relationship between contracting parties,
relational contract theory tends to underemphasize the hierarchical quality of many
contracts.68 Although it purports to be about actual norms, it often would seek to create
relations of a sort that do not yet exist.69 Contract law is not just supposed to pay attention to
the underlying relationship; the implicit hope is that it will reform it.70 The Macaulay-brand
of relationalism is more sensitive71 than Macneil to the oppressive dimensions of many social
relations that lie beneath contract, and others who have challenged the classical contract
model along similar lines have emphasized the ways in which long-term relationships against
a background of inequality engender special risks.72
Since the long-term character of some contractual relationships can be the basis for
either solidarity or oppression, the relational move toward enforcing or even just taking into
account the norms immanent in background relations is problematic.

Even where

background norms do not merely entrench hierarchical relations, those norms may depend on
his immediate purposes] is the extent to which it produces similarity of selfish interests, whereby what increases
(and decreases) the utility of one participant also increases (decreases) the utility of the other.” Id. at 1034.
68
See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract
Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (describing long-term contracts as typically between parties of relatively equal
bargaining strength who eschew formalities in part because they are familiar and comfortable with each other);
Jay Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 756 (listing many “relational
standards” that would be relevant to relational approach to contract enforcement, including “essential attributes”
of a role or status, balanced reciprocity, encouragement of trust, and “the whole range of social policies and
values other than those that grow out of the relationship”).
69
See Jay Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L REV. 829, 857-60 (1983) (describing
possibility of a utopian contract law and its alternative vision of the individual and her relations with others).
Cf. Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 772 (1981) (“Of all the legal
categories which were generated, perhaps freedom of contract appealed most directly to the utopian element of
liberalism—the belief in the potential of human freedom to form a basis for social organization.”).
70
See Feinman, Relational Contract, supra note x, at 748 (“relational theory focuses on the necessity and
desirability of trust, mutual responsibility and connection. Not all of these bonds should be legally enforceable,
but beginning analysis by recognizing them is likely to produce a broader set of obligations”).
71
Macaulay sees contract as continuous with political struggle and is pessimistic about the ability of weaker
parties to transform hierarchical contractual relations into more egalitarian ones. See Robert Gordon, Macaulay,
Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571.
72
“In the messy and open-ended world of continuing contract relations, where the contours of obligation are
constantly shifting, the effects of power imbalances are not limited to the concession that parties can extort in
the original bargain. Such imbalances tend to generate hierarchies that can gradually extent to govern every
aspect of the relation in performance. This is the potential dark side of continuing contract relations, as organic
solidarity is the bright side: what starts out as a mere inequity in market power can be deepened into persistent
domination on one side and dependence on the other.” Id. at 570.
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their unenforceability for their efficacy73, or they may simply be illusive to courts.74 That
said, there are surely some relations in which rich background norms reflect meaningful
relations that the state would do well to support. But these represent but some fraction of
contractual relations more broadly. While the emphasis of relational contract theory on the
underlying, wholistic relationship that underpins contract may be important to understanding
this subset of contract, these cases are at the periphery of contract.75
The more important and general implication of relational theory is that the obligations
of parties are not settled at a single moment of contract.

Relational contracts are

characteristically long-term, and relational theorists tend to characterize the parties’
responsiveness to evolving facts as mutual accommodation.

But new facts can be of

importance for a range of reasons, quite apart from a norm of solidarity in the face of those
facts. The central insight of relational theory is that extended duration makes it especially
costly for parties to specify their respective obligations ex ante.76 This rejection of the

73

Robert Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 597, 615 (1990) (“It may be that the
great lesson for the courts is that any effort to judicialize these social rules will destroy the very imformality that
makes them so effective in the first instance.”).

74

Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
91, 109-10 (1994) (theories that seek to give effect to parties’ “tacit assumptions” require reconstruction of
assumptions for which there is no direct empirical evidence); Robert Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 847, 848 (2000) (“If…the state is simply incapable of
supplying parties in a complex economy with useful defaults ex ante or imposing fair outcomes ex post, the
better instrumental strategy is for courts to accepts the limits imposed by legal formalism and interpret the
facially unambiguous terms of disputed contracts literalistically.”).

75

See Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise; Daniel Markovits, Solidarity at Arms-Length; Dori
Kimel, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (2003). But see John
Wightman, Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory, and the Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST L. STUD.
93, 127 (2000) (relational theory has “pointed the way toward the possibility of using the law of contract to
underpin the legal recognition of intimate relationships outside marriage”).
76
Charles Goetz & Robert Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1090, 1091 (1981)
(“Parties frequently enter into continuing, highly interactive contractual arrangements” and “[a] contract is
relational to the extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to welldefined obligations.”); Lewis Kornhauser, The Resurrection of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 184, 190 (1982)
(summarizing Macneil’s criteria as “the transaction extends over time, (2) parts of the exchange cannot be
measured or specified precisely [ex ante], and (3) the interdependence o the parties to the exchange extends at
any given moment beyond any single discrete transaction to a range of social interrelationships.”); Speidel,
supra note x, at 798 (“Relational contracts continue over an extended time…[P]atterns of interaction and
expectation develop that transcend the boundaries of the traditional discrete bargain.”).
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presumption of temporal boundedness in the classical model is of profound import and has
had deep influence, to the point where most contract theorists now describe themselves as
relationalists – even if they would not advocate the incorporation of background relational
norms into the set of binding contractual obligations courts enforce.77
II. Parallel Contract
Parallel contract incorporates the two key (if only implicit) insights of contracts of
adhesion and relational contract, respectively. First, contracts need not be robustly dyadic;
communications of either party with third parties is important to their respective
understanding of their agreement.

Second, contractual obligations are not conclusively

settled at a single moment of contract. Agreements are not just incomplete in the technical
sense that terms were not drafted to address all possible contingencies.78 They are also
obligationally incomplete in that obligations under an agreement are not settled at the
moment of its inception– not simply ill-defined, but indeterminate.
Casting doubt on the robust dyadic structure of contract should not be construed as a
challenge to the bilateralism of contract law, which is characteristic of private law more
generally.79 Private law theorists of all stripes have emphasized, in contrast to economic
approaches to private law, that the distinguishing feature of private law is that individuals are
empowered to bring claims against particular other individuals, and courts self-consciously
adjudicate those claims based on reasons that pertain to the rights and obligations of the
parties to each other. Contract law does not openly resolve disputes with direct reference to
the effect of litigation outcomes on actors other than the litigants in a given dispute.

77

See Randy Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil’s Relational Theory of Contracts, 78 VA.
L. REV. 1175, 1200 (1992) (“To a significant degree, we are all ‘relationalists’ now.”).
78
See Scott & Triantis, supra note x, at 190.
79
See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233 (1988); Ernest Weinrib, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW (1995).
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However, the bilateralism of contract law, like that of private law generally, does not
imply that the content of rights and duties of parties to one another are not informed by
others, including their past and future conduct and their values. No viable theory of private
law conceives of the rights and obligations of parties to one another entirely divorced from
social context. Almost every theory will take into account, for example, whether conduct is
reasonable in light of prevailing practices, or whether a legal rule is likely to make such
conduct (by others) more or less frequent going forward. These considerations are usual in
the tort context, even among those committed to theorizing the institution of tort in a way that
is consistent with the internal perspective of tort as essentially bilateral.
Contract law is bilateral in the sense that is characteristic of private law broadly.
What I challenge here is the notion that the content of rights and obligations between
contracting parties is set by reference solely to the acts and words of those parties in relation
to each other. The point is obvious inasmuch as we see that parties reasonably construe the
obligations they assume toward one another based on the meaning of words and acts more
generally. But in theory and practice we have been reluctant to acknowledge that what others
do and say is significant not just because it informs how parties to a given contract
understand each other, but to how they understand their contract with each other. This has
been most apparent in the context of contracts of adhesion, but the point carries to the
situation of parallel contract.
Although contracts are not necessarily personally or temporally bounded in the way
the classical model suggests, they are not unbounded either. Courts must have some limiting
principle by which they ascertain the obligations of parties and the universe of evidence
relevant to that inquiry. In this Part, I propose parallel contract as one repeat model of
contract with its own set of appropriate enforcement norms. First, I will describe the fact
pattern typical of parallel contract.

Second, I will explain the normative thrust behind
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recognizing parallel contract as a distinct paradigm worthy of its own interpretive precepts.
Third, I will discuss employment contracts in large firms as the preeminent example of
parallel contract, and work out a few of its doctrinal implications in that context.
A. The Facts of Parallel Contract
Parallel contract occurs when one party (“central party”) enters into a series of
agreements with many other individuals (“contractees”) on terms that are substantially
overlapping. Certain key terms may vary but contractees expect that most of their contract
terms are identical to those of other contractees.
In the contractual processes of parallel contract, the central party sets most terms
unilaterally, especially those terms which the contractee comes to expect are parallel as
among contractees.

Terms are not typically negotiated and in fact, contractees’

understanding of their rights and obligations under contract are based primarily on their
communications with each other. Because the transaction costs associated with negotiating
or even unilaterally tailoring terms to contractees is excessive in proportion to the benefit
derived from such tailoring, the central party tends to set the substance of most background
terms based on facts pertaining to contractees as a group, including the mean and distribution
of contractees’ preferences and capabilities.80 Those terms are then applied to all members of
the group.
Contractees expect the background terms of their own agreement to be consistent with
those of other contractees. The normative character of this expectation of homogeneity will
be discussed further below, but the factual basis for this expectation is, first, the absence of
reliable information on the basis of which contractees are able to draw nonarbitrary
distinctions amongst themselves, and second, their belief that the central party cannot do so
80

Note that the characteristic feature of parallel contract in which a central party unilaterally sets background
terms does not have to reflect superior market power. Transaction costs may be adequate to explain the
phenomenon.
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either (or, that it would not be economically worthwhile for it to undertake that task).
Homogeneity of terms, and the expectation thereof, is thus driven by the costs of acquiring
the information necessary to make nonarbitrary distinctions and by the cost of tailoring terms
to numerous individual contractees. Where the information on which distinctions can be
made is more readily available or where the aggregate number of contractees is smaller (or
the cost of tailoring terms is otherwise lower), the expectation of homogeneity will be
correspondingly weaker.
Parallel contract is not usually simultaneous. That is, contractees do not enter into
contract with the central party at the same time. However, the chronological priority of a
given contractee does not imply that either the central party or any subsequent contractee
understands their legal obligations to be controlled by the terms of the first agreement. How
then is homogeneity of background terms achieved? Each additional contractee expects her
preferences and capabilities to be as relevant to the common terms of her agreement as those
of any other contractee, but on the margin she does not expect to be the but-for cause of any
particular change in terms. Thus, the expectation will be that terms will gradually evolve as
the set of contractees (and prospective contractees) and their related preferences and
capabilities evolve, and as will the preferences and capabilities of the central party. The
present obligations of parties to parallel contract are determinable at any given moment but
are subject to ongoing revision by the central party.
Revision does not take place through deliberate modification. In fact, continuously
updating the agreement in a self-conscious manner would give rise to precisely those
transaction costs which the central party avoids by applying common terms to all contractees.
Instead, the parties’ understanding as to their rights and obligations evolves through the
cumulative effect of the myriad decisions taken by the central party in the course of
performance of its parallel contracts.

The implication for interpretation is that
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communications and practices of the central party are evidence of its obligations toward
contractees even in the absence of evidence that the central party specifically intended to
revise its obligations toward all contractees.
B. Normative Implications of Parallel Contract
In interpreting contracts of adhesion, several commentators have suggested that courts
should not just ask how consumers would reasonably construe written terms but how
consumers would reasonably understand the agreement; the latter is more obviously informed
by their experiences in the market, including their interactions with other consumers.
Similarly, in parallel contract, courts should ask not just how localized practices within a firm
may have informed a contractee’s understanding of the central party’s words and acts to that
contractee, but how communications between the central party and other contractees, and
among contractees, reasonably affected a given contractee’s understanding of her agreement
with the central party. Because the obligations of parties to parallel contract are not set at the
moment of contract formation, course of performance – as between central party and all
contractees – is of central rather than occasional significance in interpreting the evolving
substance of the parties’ obligations.
Thus far I have presumed that obligations should be construed and enforced consistent
with contractees’ understanding of their parallel agreements. But the principle of objectivity
in contract requires that these understandings be reasonable if they are to control.81 Given
that these understandings are at odds with both existing treatment of these agreements and
with some central parties’ understandings of their own obligations, why regard the
interpretive defaults proposed here as the most reasonable construction of the parties’
agreements?
81

Cf. West v. Washington Tru Sol., LLC, 147 N.M. 424, 426 (2009) (“[B]ecause an employee’s expectation
based on an employer’s words or conduct must meet ‘a certain threshold of objectivity,’ an employer may be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the employee’s reasonable expectations are not objectively
reasonable.”).
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The first step is to unpack the notion of reasonableness. While a full treatment of the
concept of reasonableness is beyond the scope of the present discussion, a contractee’s
understanding of terms may be “reasonable” in at least four respects: First, as an empirical
matter, her understanding may be consistent with how most contractees would interpret
agreements under comparable circumstances. Second, it may be fair to hold a central party
and a contractee to those terms as a substantive matter. Third, it may be fair to privilege the
contractee’s understanding of terms over that of the central party, whatever their content
might be. Finally, it may be otherwise desirable as a matter of public policy that obligations
be construed in a particular manner.
To some extent, the reasonableness of allowing contractees’ understandings of
background terms to prevail in contexts of parallel contract is built into the concept of
parallel contract. The paradigm of parallel contract applies just under those conditions under
which contractees do in fact come to understand their agreement by reference to the words
and acts of the central party in a given contractual community over the course of
performance.
It is substantively fair to hold central parties to the meanings their own words and act
project because of the legitimate interest of contractees in having some knowledge of their
own terms, and the related legitimate expectation of consistency and uniformity that informs
their understanding of what those terms must be. In the previous section parallel contract was
described as arising where contractees in fact expect homogeneity of background terms. This
expectation is normative and not just descriptive where central parties purport to contract on
identical background terms with all contractees and where there is no apparent method for
individuating background terms in a nonarbitrary way.
It is fair to privilege contractees’ understanding over those of the central party
because the central party controls those terms and is alone able to contract around defaults
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that favor contractees; the central party knows and controls contractees’ understanding, not
the other way around.82 Finally, it is desirable to enforce the understanding of contractees
because the rationality of their market behavior, and the therefore the efficiency of the
markets in which they operate, depends on the quality of their information about the content
of their contracts. As repeat contractors that control the terms, central parties are likely to
operate with more accurate information about their agreements irrespective of what the
default terms may be.
To be clear, these are not offered as reasons for parties to contract on the parallel
contract model but rather reasons why a court should interpret agreements that conform to the
fact pattern in Section A in accordance with the defaults suggested by the parallel contract
paradigm. Because parallel contracts are voluntary agreements (in that particular sense in
which all contracts are voluntary), interpreting terms as subject to ongoing revision in light of
practices and communications across an organizational setting is more reasonable if we also
have an account of why parties would contract on such terms. And indeed, at first blush one
might question the plausibility of parallel contract as a contracting strategy. First, one could
ask why the parties would leave obligations open-ended at the time of contract, subject to
ongoing revision. Second, one could ask why the parties would not expressly describe the
central party’s obligations as subject to revision in light of its practices with other
contractees; we do not normally see express provisions to this effect.83
Obligations in parallel contract are unspecified at the time of contract formation for
many of the same reasons that parties in other contexts leave their obligations vague. The
costs of drafting a contract that optimally allocates obligations in all possible states of the
world are high.

Parties can either specify obligations that are suboptimal for some
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An interpretive norm that favors contractees’ understandings, like the general rule of contra proferendum with
respect to written agreements, is a classic penalty default. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note x, at 91.
83
For example, “most favored nation” provisions could expressly state that contractees are entitled to any
benefits or rights offered other contractees.
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contingencies, or they may attempt to draft flexible terms which tie performance obligations
to future facts. Parties must balance the ex ante costs of detailed specification against the
higher ex post costs of third party verification for vague (flexible) terms.84
As with many other contracts, the optimal terms of a parallel contract turn on future
facts, e.g., facts related to future contractees. The costs of continuously drafting and applying
background terms efficiently tailored to each contractee are excessive. Contractees may
resist (e.g. retaliate by shirking) when they are given terms inferior to those offered other
contractees they perceive as similarly situated. Since it is impossible (too costly) to manage a
regime where contractees are subject to individuated terms on grounds that are transparent
and nonarbitrary, it is preferable that terms be presumptively parallel and that obligations
evolve with facts relevant to the set of optimal common terms.
Although contracts are usually assumed obligationally complete at the time of
formation, in fact the content of obligations often turns on future facts, such as market price
or the exercise of discretion by one party. Just as a contract may fix an obligation by
reference to some changing external proxy like market price, a parallel contract sets
obligation subject to revision in light of the terms of subsequent agreements entered by the
contracting party.
There is, of course, one important difference, which is that the ex post facts which
determine the central party’s obligations are within the control of the central party itself. This
explains why we do not see express provisions subjecting the central party’s obligations to
revision in light of its subsequent practices. The reasons above relating to the sensibility of
leaving obligations unsettled at the time of contracting and dependent on future contracts are
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reasons for not specifying obligations ex ante, but not reasons for a central party to adopt raft
express restrictions to its own discretion.
The normal constraint on discretion created by vague terms is the duty of good faith.
Unfortunately, this duty is itself notoriously vague, and unavoidably so given its application
to all contracts. But some restraint on discretion is necessary to disincentivize opportunistic
behavior that will deprive the other party of the benefit of its bargain. The duty of good faith
prevents parties from exploiting shifts in bargaining power over the course of performance to
usurp opportunities foregone at the time of initial contracting.85 Parallel contract can be
taken as a way of checking the power of central parties that effectively operationalizes the
duty of good faith.

It prevents central parties from abusing opportunities created by

contractees’ investments in their contracts and their relative lack of information about facts
relevant to an optimal allocation of obligations between the parties.86
The notion of parallel contract is intended to build off the existing concepts of
contracts of adhesion and relational contract. However, parallel contract departs from the
descriptive picture behind each concept and presses separate normative concerns. Contracts
of adhesion are distinct from parallel contracts in that the latter are (1) not mass in scale (2)
not open to all (3) one or more terms may vary, and (4) there is no anonymity for either
party.87 The core normative challenge with respect to contracts of adhesion has been the
quality of consent by consumers; by contrast, the concept of parallel contract is not intended
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See Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.d 187 (1989) (citing Burton, Breach of Contract and the
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86
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cooperation and effort on the part of the adherent. Certain long-term business relationships and some
employment contracts fall within this excluded category.” Id.
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to illuminate or solve any problem of consent.

Parallel contract is not concerned, for

example, with creating an opportunity for bargain, nor does it reflect angst about the fact that
contracts are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. While disparity in bargaining power helps
motivate the interpretive paradigm of parallel contract, it is not unequal bargaining power per
se. The “special rules” of parallel contract are intended to correct instead for (1) the tendency
of bargaining power to shift over the course of contract in ways that render contractees
vulnerable, and (2) the distributive and market-distorting effect of contractees’ informational
disadvantage.
Parallel contract differs from relational contract in the felt absence of solidarity;
relations are at arms-length, asymmetrical, and neither party trusts the other by choice.88 Nor
does parallel contract presume or show that such solidarity is the appropriate ambition of
contract law. Nevertheless, the notion of parallel contract should extend certain insights from
the literatures on contracts of adhesion and relational theory. And just as a few rules of
formation and interpretation have adjusted to those aspects of contractual reality revealed by
the concepts of contracts of adhesion and relational contract, the concept of parallel contract
should dislodge interpretive paradigms that have persisted in the face of poor fit with the
classical model in its particular context.
Where facts conform to the pattern of parallel contract, courts should hear evidence of
a central party’s communications and practices with respect to any contractees in a given
setting over the entire period between the moment of contract formation (with the particular
contractee with whom a dispute has arisen) and the event in dispute. Not only are events
after the moment of initial contract formation relevant to understanding the terms of the
agreement, later events may be more important than earlier events in ascertaining
contractees’ reasonable understanding of their terms. On the flip side, evidence of a central
88
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party’s private communications with a contractee are not relevant unless they are specifically
couched as deviations from the defaults of parallel contract.
The parallel contract model is most easily applied as an on/off model. That is, an
agreement either is subject to the special rules of parallel contract, or it is not. However, the
specific interpretive judgments that must be made about the content of particular agreements
can be informed by the extent to which a particular fact pattern corresponds to the protypical
pattern of parallel contract and the applicability of its motivating assumptions. For example,
where contractees’ expectation of uniform treatment is weaker, it should be easier for the
central party to deviate from the default of uniformity.
C. Employment Contracts as Parallel Contract
The best example of parallel contract occurs in the employment context.89 Large
employers enter into contracts with numerous employees without specifying all terms, such
as leave or termination policies.

The upshot of the discussion here is that employers’

obligations under those terms are appropriately interpreted as they are understood by
employees, in light of a practice of parallel contract. The practical consequence would be
that employers should be held to consistent terms and practices regardless of whether
employees can demonstrate that those practices were specifically intended by the employer to
be legally binding in their individual cases. 90
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Other examples might include landlord-tenant leases, sales contracts in subdivisions or cooperatives,
partnership agreements, franchise agreements or investor agreements with managers or hedge funds.
Applicability will turn on whether contractees in these settings are in direct communication with each other,
expect uniform background terms and are subject to the same informational disadvantages at work in the context
of employment.
90
Cf. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 823,
826 (2000) (“In a contract of employment, modern contract law assumes that the bargain between employer and
employee is independent of context unless there is proof that the agreement is supplemented by norms and
practices from the context or regulated by state or federal legislation.”).
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Some courts do just that.
contract.91

They do so primarily under the doctrine of implied

Like the proposed paradigm of parallel contract, implied contract emphasizes

employers’ practices and employees’ reasonable expectations. The presumption of at-will
employment is taken to authorize employers not only to discharge or demote at will, but also
to unilaterally alter terms of employment – so long as modifications do not breach an express
or implied agreement.92 Implied terms thus reign in employer discretion where there would
otherwise be no constraint on its practices or changes to those practices.
Implied contracts arise where an employer leads employees to believe that they have
certain contractual entitlements by virtue of the employer’s words and acts.93 Usually the
employer communication critical to employees’ reasonable expectations is an employee
handbook.94
The communications and practices of employers are legally (and otherwise
normatively) significant because they appear to account for employees’ understanding of
their legal rights, which seem stubbornly unresponsive to legal realities.95 Employees operate
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employment”); Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 503 (Utah 2010) (“Relevant evidence of the intent of the
parties usually includes the language of the manual itself, the employer’s course of conduct, and pertinent oral
representations.”); see also Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (statement that a
handbook is not to be construed as a contract and a statement that the handbook was intended to give employees
a better understanding of what they can expect from their employer were deemed contradictory).
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See Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 11 Cal.4th 454, 463 (1995) (under the “modern” “realistic” approach to
contract interpretation, “courts will not confine themselves to examining express agreements between the
employer and individual employees, but will also look to the employer’s policies, practices and communications
in order to discover the contents of an employment contract”).
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under the belief that can be dismissed only for just cause, and this belief is insensitive to
variations in the actual legal protections afforded by different states.96 At first blush the
doctrine of implied contract appears to radically rework legal treatment of the employment
relation. But though the doctrine is a general principle of contract law it has been applied
very differently by state courts. Some courts will allow employer practices to create terms
notwithstanding express disclaimers in employee handbooks97, while others refuse even to
allow for the possibility of binding terms in the absence of a written agreement for a fixedterm employment contract.98
Thirty-eight states recognize implied contract doctrine in employment.99 In particular,
most jurisdictions allow that personnel manuals may create binding obligations.100 But even
those jurisdictions that are theoretically open to implied employment terms vary in whether
they enforce both oral and written representations by employers and the extent to which
disclaimers nullify employer promises.101

The trend is to narrow rather than expand

employee protections under the doctrine of implied contract.102
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The initial move to enforce employer commitments under a re-vamped doctrine of
implied contract aimed to improve regulation of the employment relation.103 But though
there was new scrutiny of employers’ traditional prerogatives, there was no corresponding
evolution in the presumptions underlying classical contract theory. Unless substantive policy
commitments were permitted to override operation of ordinary contract requirements, there
was little room for maneuver given the ability of employers to expressly reserve all discretion
at the outset of the employment relation.104
Because it falls well within the confines of classical contract theory, implied contract
(1) remains wedded to the states of mind of the two parties to a contract as they have been
revealed directly to each other, and (2) requires courts to identify a single moment at which
terms have been offered, accepted and thereby fixed. Given these limitations, the move to
implied contract in employment turned out to be a small one.
At first, the interest of courts assessing claims of implied contract promised to move
beyond the subjective understandings of the parties. Consistent with the general principle of
objectivity, courts stated expressly that “[t]he defendant’s subjective intent is irrelevant when
she knows or has reason to know that her objective actions manifest the existence of an
agreement.”105 A few courts, as in Wooley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., held that employees
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do not need to show individual subjective reliance or awareness of the employers’ terms for
those terms to become binding.106
More often, though, the inquiry into employees’ reasonable expectations turned on
what those expectations were given what a particular employee had been told by her
employer, rather than other acts or words by the employer that might contextualize the few
direct communications between the parties to a given contract. And still more often, an
employee’s ability to invoke implied contract required that she show personal awareness or
even belief in the employer’s alleged contractual obligation.107
The inquiry into direct communications between the parties as to alleged terms and a
particular employee’s acceptance of those terms follows naturally from the presumption of
dyadic contract relations, but it is misplaced in the employment context in which employees’
understanding of their own and employers’ obligations derives from words and acts across a
bounded but numerous set of parallel agreements. Among the implied contract cases, Wooley
alone acknowledges this important feature of (many) employment contracts. It expressly
distinguished the case of a policy manual distributed to many employees from individual
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long-term employment contracts.108 General disregard of this factual predicate of most
contract claims in employment is at odds with the acknowledged reality that employers make
certain commitments to employees precisely to achieve (or at least to create the appearance
of) fair and uniform treatment of employees relative to one another. Employee handbooks
regularly self-describe as intended to ensure uniformity, impartiality, and fairness.109 Courts
emphasize this purpose too.110 But this recognition does no work inasmuch as the legal
meaning of these documents turns not on facts that are not applicable across the firm but are
specific to particular employee-plaintiffs.
Courts have also equivocated on the extent to which statements and acts by employers
over the course of employment create or modify terms. Some courts have been willing to
recognize obligations that arose after initial formation of the employment relation.111 Some
have been willing to go so far as to override an express disclaimer based on oral statements or
course of performance.112 But more often, an express statement affirming employees’ at-will
status or disclaiming legal obligation based on an employment manual are adequate to
foreclose employer liability.113 Similarly, while some courts view the evolving nature of
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employer practices as unproblematic114, others view it as inconsistent with a finding that
those practices are ever binding obligations.115 By and large, through careful statements at
the time of hiring and in disclaimers accompanying official policy statements, employers
have successfully avoided binding themselves to employee through other words and acts.
Courts are prepared to privilege one-off disclaimers over informal statements and actual
practices even though employees themselves consistently base their understanding of their
legal relations with employers on the latter.116
The doctrine of implied contract has been unable to align legal construction of
employment agreements with employee understandings because, as with express agreements,
the source of contractual obligation depends fundamentally on what individual employees
were told. Although course of performance is inconsistently allowed to modify the import of
direct communications, most courts resist these modifications because prior statements make
clear that the employer itself did not wish to assume any enforceable obligations to its
employees. Some courts sense that employers wish to have their cake and eat it too, by
instilling a sense of stability and mutuality in the workplace without committing to either; but
implied contract doctrine is without the resources to assign legal significance to the
possibility of such opportunism.
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The doctrine of good faith would normally play that doctrinal role, but it too is illequipped to control ex-post behavior that is not inconsistent with the settled terms of a prior
bargain. At issue in the employment context is ex-post manipulation, made possible not
because of implicit understandings that the parties failed to spell out at formation but because
the parties have not determined the content of their respective obligations in a substantive
sense, and are prepared to revise them continuously over the course of and through
performance.
The alternative treatment of the employment relation that I propose here could be
mistaken to abandon the requirement that contractual obligation be voluntary, inasmuch as
employers may decline to assume obligations but then inadvertently assume them through
subsequent acts or words. But liability in these cases turns on the employer choosing to
proceed in a certain manner and the employer remains capable of controlling the substance of
its obligations. Little more is required to characterize its obligations as voluntary in the
modern sense.
We have learned from contracts of adhesion that we can (and do) hold parties to terms
based on a theory of blanket authorization.117 That a consumer has chosen to go forward with
a transaction with limited knowledge as to the specific terms of contract but often with access
to related information from other consumers or transactions with other retailers or
manufacturers is enough to validate the standardized agreement. Similarly, an employer can
be understood to have consented to an employment relation in which it has not selfconsciously bought into each of its specific obligations. And the content of those obligations
vis a vis any single employee may be determined with reference to communications and
events outside of that bilateral relation.

Although not every norm of a relationship is
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appropriately regarded as legally binding, the lesson from relational theory is that in a case
like parallel contract legal obligations are not set out ex ante and can only be deciphered by
reference to words and acts over the course of performance. While there are relations in
which thick norms might be undermined by legal enforcement, parallel contract occurs where
relations are arms-length for legal purposes; the law has reason to presume or operate as if
individuals are business actors and do not intend to assume obligations or acquire rights of
the sort whose value turns on voluntary compliance.118
Because obligations in parallel contract track the words and acts of the central party,
that party is able to avoid inadvertently ratcheting up her obligations by simply declaring that
words and deeds directed at a given contractee do not reflect on the central party’s agreement
with other contractees. (The rules of parallel contract are default rules.) However, the central
party must issue disclaimers with each communication or conduct that could revise her
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Parallel contract is rarely characterized by formalized mechanisms for enforcing norms outside the law, such
as would justify an inference that the initial agreement did not contemplate amendment through subsequent
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obligations; it would not be adequate to issue such a disclaimer once at the time of initial
contracting since legal obligations are not settled then.119
The effect may be that parallel contract in the employment context will result only in
an endless wave of disclaimers on the part of employers. But these disclaimers will come at a
cost to employers and result in a corresponding benefit primarily -- though not exclusively -realized by employees.120 The cost to employers is that employees will no longer operate on
an inflated understanding of their rights; this may result in less employee loyalty, and
perhaps, more shirking. But these costs flow from an intrinsic and instrumental good:
transparency.

Employees will have a clearer understanding of their legal employment

relations. Knowledge of the truth is a human value, knowledge of legal truths is of distinctly
legal value, and the more rational decision-making that it enables is of economic value to
employees and others whose welfare is hinged to the efficient operation of labor markets.
Enforcing parallel contract as a distinctive category of contract will render the legal and
material outcomes they deliver less surprising.
III. The Implications of the Contractual Process for Contract Enforcement
My argument thus far has been that two assumptions about contract that arise
naturally from the classical picture of contract formation fail to hold in cases of parallel
contract. First, parallel contracts are not robustly dyadic. Communications between each
party and others outside of a given contract are as important to shaping the parties’ evolving
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understanding of each other’s obligations as are direct communications between the parties.
Moreover, most terms are not substantially tailored to individual parties. Only the most
important terms (e.g. salary in the employment context) are negotiated and set with respect to
information specific to a given employee. Most terms in such contracts are presumptively
parallel with those of many other individuals. Because individuals often lack any other basis
for deciphering the content of many contractual terms, it is reasonable for them to look at
how similarly situated parties contracting with the same single contractual partner have fared,
as evidence of their own rights and obligations.
The classical model is also misleading inasmuch as it has resulted in a presumption
that the obligations of contracting parties are fully determined at the moment of initial
formation. Although this may sometimes be the case, in the context of parallel contract,
obligations can (and are perceived to) evolve without deliberate modification as additional
contracts are entered which are presumptively parallel with the initial set, and as new facts
make revision of existing obligations sensible.
In comparing the classic picture of contract formation with those advanced by
contracts of adhesion, relational contract and parallel contract, respectively, my implicit claim
has been that the particular model on which a contract is formed has implications for how it
should be enforced.
Although this claim is similarly implicit in the literatures on contracts of adhesion and
relational contracting, and in the scholarship on consumer and employment contracting more
generally, high contract theory tends to eschew the possibility that banal facts about how
various contracts come into being could say something important about the normative force
of agreement. The fact of agreement itself, or the bare presence of consent (however thin)
justifies enforcing a contract, and sometimes also motivates a choice of interpretive rules.
If a fundamental principle like autonomy or the sanctity of promise can do the work
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they are called upon to do, it may indeed be irrelevant (or at least, less relevant) to contract
law whether parties fully understand the terms they sign onto, whether they had meaningful
alternatives, whether they come to expect, based on prevailing practice, that the other party’s
conduct will comply with norms other than those which were expressly stated at the time of
initial contracting, in what ways the terms of a given contract may affect the terms on which
others are likely to contract, and whether considerations of public policy, including
distributive justice, should favor certain terms over others. Each of these kinds of facts may
be relevant in a theory of contract that centers on concepts like autonomy or promise. But
especially where autonomy is conceived at a high level of abstraction, or where contractual
promise is but one instantiation of a larger promissory principle, the emphasis will be on what
a party who consents with less information and fewer options has in common with another
party who has more information and more options, rather than on the differences between
them and the contracts into which they enter.121
We can understand the distinct stances scholars take on the significance of processfacts (beyond bare consent) to fall into three types.

122

These actually amount to three

fundamentally different ways of viewing contractual process, which I will call pure, perfect
and imperfect.123 These labels are intended to roughly track the distinction introduced by
John Rawls between pure, imperfect and perfect procedural justice.

The results of a
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procedure characterized by pure procedural justice are self-justifying; the procedure itself
defines a just outcome. The classic example is a coin toss. If the process is appropriate to the
end for which it is used and executed fairly, there is no exogenous criteria to bring to bear in
assessment of the outcome.

By contrast, in perfect procedural justice, there is some

independent criterion for what constitutes a just outcome, and the procedure is perfectly
designed to arrive at that outcome. For example, having two children with equal claims to a
cake divide that cake by assigning one child the role of slicing it into two parts and allowing
the other child to choose a slice is a procedure that is perfectly designed (claims Rawls) to
achieve equal division of the cake. In that case, there is an exogenous standard by which to
assess the outcome (equality of cake slices), but also total confidence that the procedure will
achieve that outcome. Finally, there is imperfect procedural justice. A jury trial is an
imperfect procedure by which to adjudicate the guilt of a criminal defendant because,
assuming that there is a truth of the matter as to his guilt, the procedure is imperfect in that it
will not always deliver the just verdict.
Contractual processes deliver outcomes that can be described as just or unjust. The
tendency to avoid the language of justice with respect to contractual outcomes might reflect
the dominant view that contractual outcomes are rarely unjust, or actually self-justifying.
This in turn reflects the influence of pure theories of contract, in which the process of
contract formation, and the consent of the parties in particular, ensures the justice of whatever
content is agreed upon, as well as the material outcomes for the parties that follow from those
terms.
In pure contract, a basic principle such as autonomy or the value of promise justifies
enforcement of contract and shapes the rules of enforcement. Where the underlying principle
is at work, outcomes are irrelevant; contracts should be enforced without regard to the
substance of terms or the material consequences to parties that flow from those terms. Case
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law sometimes uses the rhetoric associated with pure contract.124 The rhetoric of “freedom of
contract” stems from a view of contract as pure. From this perspective, facts about a
particular type of transaction are relevant only inasmuch as they call into question whether
the fundamental value serviced by contract is in fact being advanced. Competing values are
not of interest except at the extreme (e.g. illegality).
Scholars who view the contractual process as perfect, such as many legal economists,
believe that the process of contract formation, including but not limited to the consent of the
parties, gives rise to confidence that most contracts are value-generating and leave both
parties better off than prior to contract.125 They may hold this view either because the assent
of both parties is a reliable indication that it improves the position of both126 or because
competitive markets dictate efficient terms irrespective of the state of mind of individual
parties.127

Other scholars may agree that cognitive limitations, including informational

problems, render assent an unreliable indicator of optimality, and may further acknowledge
that markets often fail to generate consistently optimal terms, but nevertheless maintain that
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for purposes of contract law courts must proceed as if terms were perfectly suited to
maximizing welfare due to epistemic and institutional constraints.128
Finally, in a view of contract as imperfect (such as the view advanced here), contract
is an imperfect means by which parties attempt to regulate certain exchanges and
relationships. Whether a given contract warrants deference on grounds of autonomy or
whether it should be modified on welfarist or public policy grounds depends on contextspecific considerations, because no general feature of contract justifies any uniform mode of
contract enforcement.
One might view contracts as imperfect along a single value axis, such as efficiency,
due to market failures and cognitive limitations. An imperfect view of contract need not be
pluralist.129 However, most scholars who doubt that contracts should be enforced as drafted
or are skeptical about the deference traditionally accorded contractual intent are moved by
some value other than the one that motivates enforcement of contract in the first place. That
is, we do not doubt that one or more important values are advanced by the institution of
contract, but their weight is variable across contracts and no single variable is dispositive on
questions of interpretation or enforcement. Even if autonomy or the institution of promise is
well-served by contract enforcement, those values do not preempt inquiry into whether
certain types of contracts undermine other values. The competing values may be relevant
either to the interpersonal relations between contractual parties or they may be public values,
such as distributive justice, that are implicated by virtue of the patterned nature of most
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commercial contracting. Contract scholars such as Melvin Eisenberg, Dori Kimel and Tim
Scanlon have offered imperfect theories of contract that accommodate this range of values.
Distinguishing contract terms that are worthy of uncomplicated deference from those
which should be treated with caution or rejected altogether requires investigation into the
circumstances of contract. In particular, it entails asking why parties contract with each other
and why they choose the terms to which they admittedly (in some relevant sense) consent.
If the process by which contracts are formed matters to the way we should enforce
contracts, it follows that no single model of contract will suffice.

There is too much

heterogeneity among contracts. The classical picture of contract is not so much substantively
flawed – after all, some contracts comport with precisely that model -- the problem is rather
its implicit claim of singularity. Because the process of contract formation matters, no grand
theory of contract will accurately capture the normative force of agreement and consistently
deliver the most appropriate tools of interpretation.
In order to flesh out the differences between pure, perfect and imperfect theories of
contract, how they differ in their doctrinal prescriptions, and to demonstrate the limitations of
the two former categories, the remainder of this Part discusses how these labels apply to a
number of important theories of contract.
A. Pure
Pure theories of contract usually start with a commitment to autonomy.

This

commitment is not unique, but it does special work in views of contract which see the
institution as essentially serving autonomy. As Gregory Klass has pointed out, there are
important differences between theorists who emphasize the ways in which autonomy or some
other value result in the ascription of moral obligation upon certain acts or words, and those
which emphasize that contract enhances or extends autonomy by making it possible for us to
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bind ourselves in ways that we otherwise could not.130 The theories considered below fall on
both sides of this useful line, but they have in common a view of contract that is more or less
internally complete with reference to a single underlying value. Because a single value is
taken to validate contractual outcomes, and because that value is normally one that is realized
in the bare process requirements of contract, the rules of contract interpretation are regarded
as generalizable without reference to details of process and how those may correspond to
outcomes.
The three theories I will consider here are the promise-based account of Charles Fried,
the consent-based account of Randy Barnett, and the sovereignty-based account of Jody
Kraus. In Fried’s account, the moral obligations of promise both justify and require legal
enforcement of certain promises. In Barnett’s account, manifestation of assent to be legally
bound require and justify legal enforcement of contractual obligations. In Kraus’ account,
the principle of personal sovereignty requires that individuals be treated as capable of
assuming legally binding obligations where they attempt to do so. Each of these theories
makes claims of both necessity and sufficiency, and presents itself as an alternative to the
others. It does not easily accommodate values outside of the single value around which it is
centered, which is itself conceived at a high level of abstraction. There is little room left in
which to attend to details of the contractual process and how those social facts might affect
appropriate judicial treatment of particular terms. The respective insights of each theory are
obscured by its monotheistic character.
1. Charles Fried
Charles Fried gave the most comprehensive account of contract as promise in his
book by that title, published thirty years ago. In that book, he argued that individuals should
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value the institution of promise because it generates a range of benefits attainable only
through the cultivation of trust; most notably, it makes it possible to alter one’s one normative
position.131

Promises are not just useful, however. Once made, they are morally binding

because breach of a promise represents abuse of the institution. To make a promise and then
break it, he argues, is to exploit a convention in way that is disrespectful to all its
participants.132 He describes his view as Kantian because he sees the duty to keep promises
as a presumptively absolute one that reflects the promisor’s own autonomy interests.133 And
like Kant, he finds that our autonomy interest requires treating others in a manner that is
consistent with a rule or convention that we would ourselves endorse.134 Fried famously
argues that contractual obligation is just a “special case” of the more “general obligation to
keep promises,” and that “the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.”
Fried’s theory hangs on the classical picture of contract. He does not spend much
time describing the circumstances under which most contracting occurs, including the
motivations of the parties for making the particular promises they make to one another, or the
absolute and relative degrees of necessity each side may perceive in the transaction. But he
presumes that parties encounter each other with no moral, political or social baggage. He

131
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observes, for example, that “[b]y promising we transform a choice that was morally neutral
into a choice that is morally compelled.”135
But the making of most promises is not morally neutral. Ordinary promises are
especially likely to be situated within intimate relationships with thick pre-existing norms and
obligations. But even contractual promises arise against background duties owed by citizens
or residents of a political economy toward one another,136 as well more particularized duties
that often precede contract within relations or networks of exchange.137 An employer may
enter into a new contract of employment with an individual because the employer previously
promised a promotion. A person may agree to hire one person rather than another because
she is duty-bound to offer someone like her an opportunity that others in her group have been
historically denied, or she may hire the person on terms offered to other employees because
there is a norm of equality with respect to those terms. A person may agree to sell a service
or good because of an obligation (legal or otherwise) not to discriminate, or she may contract
on particular terms though she would prefer others in order to avoid breach of a background
duty of fairness or justice that she has to her prospective partner. These examples may
remind one of Patrick Atiyah’s claim that promises may be regarded as evidence of a duty
owed by the promisor to the promise.138 Or of David Slawson’s claim that under “the new
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meaning of contract,” contracts entail just those obligations which consumers would
reasonably expect, though businesses are free to spell out and give definition to those
obligations within the bounds of reasonableness.139 In each of the above cases it is strictly
speaking true that the particular content of the promise determines what the promisor is
obligated to do; the background moral claims do not explain the full or precise content of the
obligation assumed.140 But the promise is not morally neutral in the way Fried assumes. The
universe of moral considerations extends beyond the single value of autonomy in which Fried
is interested.
Fried does not expressly presume equal bargaining power, but he does describe
contracting in a way that implies that parties are similarly situated vis a vis one another, and
need each other equally. For example, he explains the motivation of contracting parties thus:
“You want to accomplish purpose A and I want to accomplish purpose B. Neither of us can
succeed without the cooperation of the other. Thus I want to be able to commit myself to help
you achieve A so that you will commit yourself to help me achieve B.”141
Whether one envisions the contracting process as characterized by equal bargaining
power affects whether one is likely to be concerned with the quality of consent behind
promissory obligation.

If everyone enters into contract as a result of a benign mutual

interdependence, contract facilitates cooperation, not exploitation. Understood this way,
whatever logical limits there are to consent are just the inevitable limits to human freedom
where we are needy beings who want things that can only be had with the cooperation of
less distinctive than they are taken to be because promises often arise in connection with, but are not fully
determined by, background duties.
139
W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contract Law by Standard Forms,
46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 28 (1984-85).
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number of acts. See Immanuel Kant, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 153 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). For
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on the scope of justiciable rights in private law).
141
Fried, supra note x, at 13.
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others. This aspect of the human condition may or may not be a tragedy, but it is at least not
an injustice.
But if we understand contract to arise between persons who are not equally dependent
on one another, the story reads differently. The quality of consent is more concerning – and
one is more likely to see it as failing in particular instances – if it is variable, and especially if
it varies even between the two parties to a given contract. It is difficult to apprehend let alone
settle on an abstract, absolute level of consent that validates the enforcement of agreements.
But the question before courts is whether an agreement should be enforceable by one party as
against another, and if there is a difference in the relative quality of consent that those two
parties brought to bear on the initial agreement, that can be normatively significant in a way
that Fried’s picture of contract does not allow. The differences between contracting parties
are negligible if their only relevant traits are their most abstract powers of reason and choice.
Fried’s promise-centered view of contract produces an unconditional, absolutist view
of contractual obligation that is one of its virtues, from at least the perspective of Fried
himself. He regards it as essential to an attractive (or accurate) view of contract as an
institution that it be predictably consistent in its admonition to keep promises. His view of
contractual obligation generates a duty to keep each promise irrespective of most facts that
arise after the time of contracting, except for those limited range of facts that undermine the
value underpinning contract in the first place. That is, only facts that suggest that the making
of the promise – and being held to it – would not be an expression of autonomy are entitled to
be considered in the judgment of whether to enforce a contract; other facts that speak to the
desirability of the outcome resulting from contract enforcement are not relevant.
Even circumscribed to considerations of autonomy, the inquiry he envisions is too
narrow.

Because even if enforcing promises that were intended to be legally binding

effectuates the autonomy of promisors, it does not exhaust the mandates of autonomy. For
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example, although I do not espouse let alone adequately defend such a view here, our
ongoing autonomy interests might encompass the power to reconstitute our ends, adjust our
life plans and revise our obligations. Of course, to the extent the power to change ourselves
in these morally salient ways implicates the rights of others, our autonomy interest is
outweighed by the interests of others. But Fried wishes to defend the status of promissory
obligations as binding with reference to the moral interests of the promisor alone. And in that
case, it is unclear why we should privilege the autonomy interest in being able to create
enforceable moral obligations over the autonomy interest in being able to continuously
exercise our agency to the fullest, by revising our ends and rejecting earlier commitments we
undertook.142 This objection is not merely theoretical. It is not at all clear that the autonomy
of consumers, franchisees, and employees who regret their choices in contract is well-served
by holding them to the promises they made in situations from which they wish to extricate
themselves, and with priorities or values they now disavow.
Moreover, a moral or legal rule that recognizes the power to bind oneself through
promise without qualification is not obviously one that best respects the autonomy of persons.
When one envisions contracting along the lines featured in the classical picture of
contracting, it might appear that by contrast the terms on which one chooses to obligate
oneself have no impact on others, and thus should be presumptively free and binding once
agreed upon. But in a market, and especially in those markets where terms are homogenous
across contracting parties, the terms to which a single party agrees directly affect the
probability of those or other terms being offered to others. More generally, the pattern of
conduct that takes place within a single contractual relationship informs other parties who
contract with the same partner or other similarly situated parties. Thus, regulators as well as
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courts may have reasons for restricting the terms on which parties are free to contract in order
to preserve certain contracting freedoms for other parties. The terms available to those who
follow are as important to their autonomy as are the terms on which a given promisor is
permitted to contract.
A utilitarian take on contract may be vulnerable to a range of critiques, but for Fried,
one of its chief flaws is the conditionality of contractual obligation on such a view. He
complains of that view that “it will allow me to break my promise whenever the balance of
advantage (including, of course, my own advantage) tips in that direction. The possible
damage to the institution of promising is only one factor in the calculation…There is no a
priori reason for believing that an individual's calculations will come out in favor of keeping
the promise always, sometimes, or most of the time.”143
It is certainly not my aim here to defend the utilitarian perspective. But the argument
here is that the sanctity of promise is only one of many moral imperatives that flow from the
over-arching principle of autonomy, and a prior reasons derivative from the principle of
autonomy are only a subset of the relevant considerations. A principle that makes no room
for other considerations is not principled but arbitrary in its exclusion of the rich diversity of
considerations that we bring to bear on most weighty moral and political matters, including
the enforcement of contract.
2. Randy Barnett
One of the problems others have pointed out with respect to Charles Fried’s
promissory theory of contract is that it fails to explain why some promises are enforceable
while others are not. Randy Barnett’s consent-based theory of contract corrects for this flaw
by hinging contractual enforcement on the parties’ consent to legal enforcement of their
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contractual obligations.144

While promise theory turns on the invocation of the social

institution of contract, consent theory turns on the invocation of the legal institution of
contract.145

In this view, “legal enforcement is morally justified because the promisor

voluntarily performed acts that conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable
obligation by transferring alienable rights.146 The theory of contract piggy backs on an
underlying theory about entitlements and how they are acquired and transferred.147
Importantly, the operative consent on this view is not consent to assume a moral
obligation but rather consent to state enforcement of the obligation assumed. Moreover,
consent is not merely a subjective mental state. Although correspondence between subjective
and object intent is normatively desirable, Barnett explains that “[t]he consent that is
required” for enforceability “is a manifestation of an intention to alienate rights.”148 Courts
are justified in imposing legal liability based on a contract where the party indicated in
advance that she is prepared to accept that specific authority, presumably in exchange for the
moral and material benefits of making a credible commitment to the other party.
This view can be understood as a “pure” view of contract because consent is a
necessary149 and sufficient150 condition for the imposition of legal liability (upon breach of
contract).

Its logic and clarity are highly appealing.

Barnett is persuasive about the

justificatory force of consent at a foundational level. But at least in his earlier work, Barnett
asked consent to do too much. Even if consent to contract underpins the imposition of
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liability in connection with an agreement, it cannot account for each of the specific
obligations to which a given contract gives rise; it cannot be understood to be a necessary
condition for the legitimacy of each of those terms.
Just as consent falters when it is regarded as a necessary condition for specific
contractual obligation, rather than the existence of a contract, the absence of consent is not
the only justification for refusing to enforce terms of an agreement to which the parties
indicated assent. Barnett allowed for only narrow exceptions to enforcement where intention
to be legally bound was in fact manifest. He could be read to have required enforcement
even where that result would produce unattractive results (unattractive on fairness, welfare or
efficiency criteria) as between the two parties to the contract in question or which contribute
to a pattern of contracting that is socially undesirable for reasons that have nothing to do with
the intentions or interests of the parties to a given contract.
a. Consent as a Necessary Condition
Requiring manifestation of an intention to be legally bound may be intuitively
plausible if contracting is a fully deliberate activity. In the classic picture of contracting,
terms are indeed deliberately selected from a range of possibilities, and parties are both
informed and careful about the obligations they assume and the role of the state in enforcing
those obligations. But in situations such as parallel contract, there is no magic moment of
contract.
At the moment at which a contractual relationship begins, the parties express an
intention to be legally bound. But they do not specify even all those terms which their
express agreement appears to contemplate, and therefore, it is unclear whether they intend
terms that acquire specificity at a later date to be fully enforceable, or enforceable only at the
minimum threshold that would be consistent with the initial agreement. For example, if an
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employer and an employee agree on health care coverage but do not specify which health
care plan will be provided and at what premium, is the health care plan ultimately provided
subsumed under the original agreement such that it becomes a contractual entitlement itself?
Or should it be understood not as a specification of a contractual obligation but as the
exercise of discretion under the contract, such that down the road provision of any health care
plan should be understood to fulfill the employer’s obligation to provide coverage, if it would
have been acceptable at the outset? In principle, we can simply ask what the parties intended
at the time of initial contracting. But the reality is that the parties may not have thought about
the scope of legal enforcement, and if they did, their expectations as to the contract’s legal
operation were likely to differ substantially.
More generally, fidelity to Barnett’s consent requirement (without consent, the
parties’ “freedom from contract” is violated), means twisting the notion of consent to the
inevitability of incomplete contracts. All contracts are incomplete, and courts rely on default
rules to fill in contractual gaps.151 Richard Craswell has argued that consent simply fails to
generate specific default rules in light of the ambiguous and general quality of parties’
consent.152

Barnett argues in reply that consent provides a reason to prefer some

interpretative defaults over others. In some cases, the silence of the parties is appropriately
interpreted as consent to application of established defaults.153 In other cases, majoritarian

151

Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)
152
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489
(1989).
153
Randy Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 827
(1992); see also Randy Barnett, And Contractual Consent…, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421, 430 (1994)
(“Although these tacit assumptions are not conscious, they are nonetheless quite real and they account for much,
though not all, of the parties' silence.”).

57

defaults conform to prevailing understandings of the applicable legal rule, even if those rules
and the possibility of their application were never specifically contemplated.154
Even if we are able to discern that the parties’ intentions are better served by
interpreting and enforcing the contract one way or the other, the more elaborate and
hypothetical the exercise of connecting their intentions with specific obligations the less
normatively compelling the “fact” of their consent to whatever content we settle upon.
Consent is most compelling when it corresponds to an actual cognitive moment, not when it
is constructed or extrapolated.155 Because once we embark upon an exercise of constructing
consent, we are always asking a normative question about when it would be reasonable to
deem a party as having consented. Reasonableness, especially as assessed by judges, is not
an empirical examination of whether more people are likely to interpret events one way rather
than another. When a court inquires whether a party should be deemed to have assumed a
particular obligation they are asking (or at least take into account) whether the world would
be better off (whether in a utilitarian sense or otherwise) if such an obligation were
imposed.156 That inquiry diverges from the classic account of consent which centers squarely
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on the internal intentions of the party in question, including their background (subconscious)
assumptions.157
When discussing the details of interpretation, Barnett is open to the consideration of
factors other than consent. He does not describe interpretation as an exercise in maximizing
the probability that the terms as enforced correspond to how the parties would have expected
the agreement to be enforced. He does not assert that terms supplied by default rules are
never imposed for reasons of principle or policy, just that they are not “invariably” of this
type.158 Given the lack of evidence judges likely face regarding the parties’ state of mind in
contracting, he accepts that both moral theory and economic analysis appropriately figure in
the selection of default rules.159 Although the role of these theories is supposed to be a
reconstruction of consent, he admits such a resort to theory is “funny evidence” of consent.
He also allows outright for the independent significance of exogenous policies, though he
insists that “there is always an additional reason that partly explains and justifies the
enforcement of whatever background rules are chosen: the parties have manifested their
intent to be legally bound.”160 And he admits that the “legitimating character of consent”
might “run out at some point,” but argues that “it can be revived” by the choice of legal
system itself.161
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Barnett’s consent theory can be interpreted two ways. The theory could insist on the
priority of consent at all stages of contract interpretation. The problem then is that the
reasons Barnett articulates for requiring consent – namely, facilitating a system that takes into
account private information and enables reliance on the existing distribution of resources162 –
are not inherently exclusionary. These are reasons for favoring a system that does not lightly
transfer private entitlements, but those reasons operate with varying force in different
contexts. The more plausible version of the theory holds that consent to enter contract is
necessary before contract law can be invoked in the first place, and that the legitimacy of
imposing liability on a party is enhanced by (but does not require) reasons for believing that
she would have consented to the particular obligations she is deemed to have breached.
b. Consent as Sufficient Condition for Binding Obligation
Taking consent to be an adequate condition for enforceable obligation produces
unfamiliar and unattractive results too.163 Barnett allows for a limited set of circumstances
under which contractual obligation can be excused; excuses are limited to cases where
manifestation of assent lacks its “normal moral…significance.”164 These cases fall into three
groups. In the first category, consent was obtained improperly, as by way of duress or
misrepresentation. In the second category, the promisor lacked the ability to meaningfully
consent, as in incapacity. The third and final category covers situations in which consent was
offered based on an assumption that later proves false, and where the promisor whose consent
was so compromised ought not to bear the risk of the error in her assumptions.165

162

Barnett, Sound of Silence, supra note x, at 859-60.
Cf. id. at 828 (“Freedom of contract entails both freedom to contract—the power to effect one's legal
relations by consent—and freedom from contract—the immunity from having one's rights to resources
transferred without one's consent.”).
164
Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note x, at 318.
165
Id. at 318.
163

60

However, some of the situations in which we override a party’s consent are ones
where consent does not have its ordinary moral significance because it was a function of
unfortunate facts, even if those facts are not the fault of the other party. For example, a party
that lacks information or favorable options may be spared the results of her own free
contracting on the grounds that her consent reflects a cramping of personality and autonomy,
rather than its flourishing.
Consider regulations that make it possible to void certain kinds of purchases without
inquiry (e.g., from door-to-door salespeople or at the beauty counters in department stores).
Regulatory intervention that makes it impossible to bind oneself in certain ways, on these
grounds, does not necessarily comment on the conduct of the other party in the usual or in
any particular case. It simply recognizes that the value in allowing people to freely transfer
their entitlements – significant as it is – sits alongside other values which are not always
equally well-served by enforcement of particular kinds of promises.

For example, an

employee may has an interest in choosing the free transfer her entitlement to her time in
exchange for wages, but an agency may choose to limit the terms on which she can do so on
the grounds that tying her hands may make it possible for her to extract better terms from an
employer.
More often, legal restrictions on contract outside the categories identified by Barnett
is motivated by the interests of individuals outside any particular prospective contract. It is
aimed at altering a pattern of contracting. In the example above, we restrict the terms on
which employees may contract with employers even where they would prefer the unavailable
terms for the benefit of other employees, who are less likely to obtain their preferred terms
should they have to compete with employees willing to work on terms more preferable to
employers. Whether this calculation ultimately makes sense depends on empirical questions,
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as well as a value judgment about the relative weight of the interests of various categories of
employees. But the answer cannot be decided with reference to the sanctity of the underlying
entitlements.

An entitlement theory identifies important values in treating certain

prerogatives as presumptive, and certain transfers of those entitlements as presumptively
enforceable. But it does not plausibly identify the only value implicated by a contracting
regime, and it does not trump the other values that sometimes surface.
To be fair, Barnett’s theory is targeted toward explaining and guiding adjudication in
common law, not warding off statutory regulation. But the consent-based view historically
and theoretically tends toward radical prioritization of the interest in controlling our
presumptive entitlements at the expense of other values, with the result that it breeds deep
skepticism about any intervention in the contract relationship – ex ante or ex post.
3. Kraus
Most recently, Jody Kraus has offered another account of contract based on an
underlying theory of promise. He begins with the fundamental value of personal sovereignty,
which is intended to reflect “a conception of the individual as sovereign over all matters
exclusively affecting his own life.”166 Personal sovereignty on his view entails not just the
right to choose not just one’s values, ends or conception of the good life but also “how to
pursue those ends.”167 And he describes promising as “a particularly valuable means for
pursuing ends.”168 Kraus does not claim that all questions of moral permission and obligation
be answered with reference to personal sovereignty alone, but claims that recognizing the
moral power to assume promissory obligation enhances personal sovereignty without
undermining any competing moral value. It follows, he claims, that for those committed to
166
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personal sovereignty as a fundamental value, the normative power to bind oneself through
promise is a basic individual liberty.169
Kraus presents contractual obligation as continuous with promissory obligation, and
in this respect resembles Fried. Like Fried and Barnett, Kraus’ view of contract is pure in
that he sees the intention to assume an obligation as necessary and sufficient to justify
recognition of such an obligation. Contractual obligations are promissory obligations, which
are in turn moral obligations, and “[i]n the domain of moral obligation…intention serves not
only to limit the range of actions over which individuals can be held morally accountable, but
also as the sole source of purely self-originating moral responsibility.”170 Kraus emphasizes
that on his view the normative power to make binding promises derives from the value of
personal sovereignty, it does not merely serve it.171 He argues that a theory of promise must
hold that keeping a promise necessarily promotes a moral value (personal sovereignty, in the
case of his theory) and that such a value is necessarily undermined by breaking a promise, or
else “render promissory obligation contingent, dependent entirely on whether keeping a
promise in an given instance promotes that interest or value.”172 The theory is thus motivated
in part to capture the ostensibly absolute character of promissory obligation, which may be
outweighed in a given instance by competing obligations or duties, but which is effective
irrespective of the details of process or context. The personal sovereignty view is subject to
three problems, each of which stems from this purity.
First, because Kraus draws a sharp boundary between obligation and duty, contractual
obligation is deemed wholly voluntary and enforceable if and only if traceable to an intent to
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be bound.173 However, though obligations that arise from contract may be distinctively
voluntary as compared to other sources of legal liability, they are in fact mixed in that they
reflect both background duties and voluntary undertakings. In other cases, background duties
may mediate the relationship between contractual intent and the nature and scope of
contractual obligation. Kraus’ view of contractual obligation as wholly voluntary depends on
the sharp line he draws between moral duties and moral obligations. Unlike the former, the
latter are entirely self-imposed, and because promises are a mechanism by which to undertake
a moral responsibility, promises create obligations rather than duties.174
The analytic sharpness of the distinction between duty and obligation does not map on
to the reality of contractual obligation. As discussed above in connection with Fried, many
contracts are undertaken in order to fulfill perceived duties.175

Extralegal promises

sometimes have this character, where a promisor makes a promise in order to assure a
promisee that she will comply with some relevant norm or duty.
Overlap between voluntary obligation and involuntary duty is the usual case in
contract. The legal rules by which promises are recognized as legally binding do not turn just
on expressions of intention to be bound but also on facts about the relations out of which
promise arise – facts that speak to duty as much as voluntary obligation. Most important, the
doctrine of consideration treats promises that have been made in exchange for some benefit
enforceable unless legal enforceability is expressly disclaimed; promises made in the absence
of exchange are unenforceable even where the parties attempt to render the binding before the
law.176 The effect is that contracts are relations in which something would be owed, promise
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or no promise.177 To be sure, the promise that one actually made in order to induce the
benefit conferred by the promisee in return determines precisely what one owes. And while
in some cases, in the absence of a promise, quasi-contract would avoid the result of unjust
enrichment178, in other cases, no compensation at all would be legally required in the absence
of a voluntary commitment.179 But even where the law would not recognize any duty to pay
for a benefit received, outside of personal relationships, something usually is owed from a
moral standpoint upon receipt of a benefit. (It is not necessary here to claim that it is always
owed.) This is why we avoid receiving benefits where we wish neither to assume any
reciprocal obligation nor to imply the existence of the kind of relationship in which mutuality
is not required.
One might argue that the duties created by receipt of a benefit are not properly
regarded as involuntary duties because they are received in the context of a voluntary
exchange. But if the act of exchange renders related obligations wholly voluntary, then many
duties outside of contract, including in the realm of tort, are similarly voluntary. Many duties
of care in tort arise upon the voluntary assumption of a role – sometimes in the context of
exchange.

They are involuntary in that the duties attach upon assumption of the role

irrespective of whether they are ever expressly contemplated or embraced.
Contract is distinctly but not exhaustively voluntary. The role of contracting parties is
setting their respective obligations is unique in that they participate more directly than in
other spheres of potential legal liability. But their role is not unique in the sense of exclusive.
Rules recognizing contract on grounds other than bare intention to be legally bound reflect
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some subset of the reasons we have for enforcing contractual obligation. The voluntary
assumption of particular contractual obligations is another part of the totality of reasons for
agreeing to enforce some promises but not others. Contractual obligation may be treated as a
case of voluntary obligation rather than duty, but involuntary duty does background work in
generating and shaping the promissory obligation.
In other cases, involuntary legal duties mediate between the obligations that an
individual intends to undertake, and the actual scope of her contractual obligation. Like
Barnett, Kraus sees the objectivity of contract as flowing naturally from his theory180, so the
mere fact that we do not defer to the promisor’s actual intent in each case but resort to
defaults is not a challenge to the theory. However, these defaults cannot be reduced to our
best guess as to – or a reasonable interpretation of -- promisors’ intentions in the usual case.
“Penalty defaults” are intended to force information out of a party that might be tempted to
withhold certain information. Interpretive defaults sometimes also encapsulate involuntary
duties in that they read the promisor’s words and acts in such a way as to render the resulting
obligation reasonable in their light. Consider interpretive defaults that require employment
contracts to very expressly waive certain statutory rights, even if less clear language would be
strong evidence that the parties intended to see those rights waived.

As discussed in

connection with Barnett’s consent theory, this is a different exercise than the pure theory
would suggest, which would focus at best on what the promisee might reasonably have
understood the promisor to intend.
Involuntary duties thus inform the obligations we “freely” assume and also inform
courts’ interpretation of obligations that are not clearly specified.

The result is that

regulators and courts have reasons for finding obligation outside of the parties’ intentions.
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Those reasons may be insufficient without some kind of intent to contract; but the universe of
reasons relevant for reading a specific contract term are not limited to the parties’ intentions
with respect to that particular contractual obligation.
The second problem with Kraus’ view of contract is also one he shares with Fried.181
Even if the normative power of making binding promises is appropriately regarded as a
manifestation of personal sovereignty, there are other normative powers which we might also
recognize on the grounds that they advance autonomy. As discussed above, the ability to
continuously revise or at least occasionally update one’s ends is also valuable to our sense of
self-governance. If there are some rights that we treat as inalienable in order to honor and
preserve dignity and autonomy, there are others that should be more difficult to alienate in
order to preserve those same values. Tracing contract, via promise, to personal sovereignty is
both plausible and compelling because of the wide span of the principle of autonomy. But
that same breadth means the principle generates many imperatives, of which the promise
principle is but one.
Finally, the boundaries of the power to obligate oneself implicates the sovereignty of
others in ways similar to the boundaries of one’s duties. Kraus claims to the contrary that,
while individuals may not be delegated control over their moral duties because those affect
others around him, we may be recognized to have the power to undertake obligations because
it does not similarly diminish the sovereignty of others.182
Our duties to others obviously implicate others’ interests, the latter usually motivating
the content of those duties in the first place. But as discussed in connection with Fried, our
voluntary obligations affect others too. Where each contract is viewed in isolation, and
especially where the commitment undertaken by one party to a contract is viewed in isolation
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from that of the other party’s obligation (a perspective toward which the emphasis on promise
tends), the obligations of one party may seem free-standing and without import for the
obligations of either the other party or future parties.

But in fact, when we make it

impossible for a party to make certain legally binding commitments, or even just difficult to
do so (e.g. by raising transaction costs through interpretive defaults), we alter the pressures to
which the other party is subject, and therefore which promises she may make or avoid. In a
market where individual exchanges are not negotiated, we affect the probability of certain
contractual possibilities for later parties. When we interpret one party’s obligations in one
manner rather than another, we affect how similarly situated parties, as in parallel contract,
are likely to understand the terms of their own agreements. The capacity to make binding
commitments is a normative power with material impact on the world and other agents in it.
Personal sovereignty cannot explain why we should maximize the sphere of contractual
freedom for one at the expense of others.
None of this is to deny that personal sovereignty is implicated in how we regard
promises, in morality and in law. But the truth in Kraus’ account of promise, as in Barnett’s
and Fried’s accounts, is undermined by the categorical nature of the claims they make on
behalf of contractual intent. We can respect the importance of entitlements in the weight we
assign them and the decision to transfer them. And we can respect the ways in which the
normative power of promise-making serves the principle of autonomy by treating the fact that
someone has voluntarily assumed a legally enforceable obligation as a weighty reason in
favor of enforcement. But it need not follow that specific contractual intent is either a
necessary or sufficient condition for imposing liability under an agreement that is generally
voluntary. The particular weight we should assign the intent of the parties at the magic
moment of contract appropriately turns on facts relating to the process by which their
agreement came into being, and the process by which it was executed.
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A. Perfect
A perfect theory of contract differs from a pure theory in that it does not claim that the
process of contract formation is self-justifying.

The fact of assent does not justify

enforcement of contracts directly but is rather an indicator of something else: that the
exchange as contemplated by the parties is welfare-maximizing for those parties.183 The
basic idea is intuitive. If Ann is willing to exchange item A in order to obtain B she must
value B more than A.184 The difference in value between what she gives up (A) and what she
secures through exchange (B) is her transactional surplus. In a voluntary exchange we would
expect both parties to have such a surplus. Moreover, inasmuch as they choose to forego an
infinite number of alternative terms on which they might have exchanged, we would expect
the free exchange to maximize their joint transactional surplus. Consent, or at least, the
voluntariness of exchange, does the work in this account of contract.

But it is not

normatively significant in itself. It is firm evidence that the exchange meets an exogenous
test of efficiency, or welfare maximization.185
Another version of the perfect theory of contract focuses less on the assent of
individuals and more on the market in which exchanges take place. For all the reasons that
are commonly enlisted to explain the virtues of the market in efficiently allocating resources,
183
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we would expect voluntary exchanges that take place in competitive markets to occur on
terms that reflect optimal pricing and supply.186 This account does not rely on informed
consent by individuals to particular terms for confidence that those terms are welfaremaximizing.187 The terms of individual contracts are not importantly set by individuals at all
but are the product of market processes. The latter process is, again, not inherently worthy of
deference, but rather facilitates private ordering on efficient market terms. The exogenous
and independently defensible aim of optimally deploying social resources justifies deferring
to a process well-positioned to achieve that result.
The perfect view of contract, with its emphasis on efficiency or welfaremaximization, is generally characteristic of economic theories of contract. Many economists
would resist this characterization, however. No economist would deny the possibility of
market failure, and most would acknowledge that behavioral economics has substantially
undermined our confidence that parties consent to only those transactions that maximize or
even improve their well-being. But the category probably encompasses more scholarship
than scholars themselves are likely to admit, because many scholars of contract approach
contract with a strong presumption that, even if contracting does not in fact produce optimal
terms – i.e., even if reading contracts literally with the curtailed aim of deciphering parties’
intent will not enforce the optimal bargain – it is the best that courts can hope to
accomplish.188
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At first blush, treating contracts as presumptively optimal due to epistemic constrains
may sound more like an imperfect view of contract than a perfect one. After all, almost no
one proposes that contracts should not be presumptively enforceable. Even those most
skeptical about the fairness and bindingness of contracts would enforce them as written in
most cases. How is a view that deems them presumptively enforceable in light of the
institutional limitations of courts fundamentally different?
The difference is that when we describe a view of contract as pure, perfect or
imperfect, we do so with the aim of informing the interpretation and enforcement of
contracts. Thus, the relevant question is not so much whether contracts are in fact selfjustifying or will always comport with some exogenous standard but rather whether courts
should treat them as such. Economists who argue that courts are systematically unable to
gauge the facts that would be relevant to fine-tuning enforcement of contracts effectively
argue that, for purposes of contract law, contracting should be regarded as perfect.
Some of the problems with a more straightforward perfect account of contracting have
been well-developed by legal economists themselves, especially behavioral economists.
Some have responded by invoking institutional constraints, and thus defend the more subtle
variant of the perfect view.

But other problems with the perfect view are less easily

accommodated by resort to skepticism about the capabilities of judges and courts. For
example, one of the most important challenges to the perfect view of contract doubts the
radical priority afforded the principle of welfare maximization as the standard against which
to assess either contracts or proposed enforcement regimes. 189
Others would argue that scholars who argue for limited discretion in the application of
rules of interpretation and enforcement underestimate the capacities of judges and juries and
189
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overestimate the costs associated with judicial error. The costs of judicial error might be less
in aggregate than would appear to be the case because most cases are not ultimately resolved
in court – and indeed, to the extent judicial error is frequent and unpredictable, we would
expect private settlement to increase and opportunity for judicial error to proportionately
decline.

Finally, what legal economists regard as judicial error usually involves false

reconstruction of contractual intent. But error from this standpoint may systematically favor
the equities; that is, judges may not resolve factual uncertainty randomly but lean toward
results which minimize loss, distribute loss more evenly, or penalize opportunistic behavior
(even where technically permitted by contract). In that case, flexible standards are not an
invitation to error but enable incorporation of norms that would be still more difficult through
bright line rules – because the institutional process by which those rules would be written is
flawed too.
B. Imperfect
An imperfect view of contract sees contract as less special than it might be regarded
under the alternative perspectives. There is no single fundamental value from which general
principles of contract must follow, and there is nothing about the process by which contracts
are formed that can generate confidence that the terms which that process produce are
necessarily just or worthy of deference by courts when asked to enforce them.
Most imperfect theories of contract are pluralist in that they treat as relevant a range
of values in answering classic questions of contract doctrine.190 While skepticism about the
sanctity or reliability of contractual processes is possible with reference to a single value,
those who see multiple values at stake in contract are especially likely to conclude that
190
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individual contracts do not consistently serve those values in ideal combination.191 There is
no obvious mechanism by which one would expect the heterogeneous processes by which
contracts are formed to perfectly negotiate relevant values, no reason to believe that
contractual outcomes will reflect an optimal balance among those values.
Although imperfect theories of contract will usually acknowledge a range of relevant
values, related prescriptions for contract doctrine need not be ad hoc.

The process of

adjudicating contract disputes may begin with certain presumptions – indeed, no scholar of
contract, to my knowledge, has recommended either abandoning the presumption that
contracts are enforceable or ignoring the intent of the parties in the course of interpreting its
terms. And separate, irreducible values may each have a particular role to play at fixed points
in a given adjudication.
A number of scholars have offered sophisticated accounts of contract which
demonstrate the possibilities in an imperfect view of contract. Their accounts of contract are
notably heterogeneous. But they have a common skepticism about the ability of a single
value to justify contract enforcement and invite scrutiny of contractual outcomes in light of
the range of relevant values.
Tim Scanlon has defended a view in which “the use of state power to enforce
contracts, or to require compensation when they are breached, is morally permissible if a
principle licensing this use is one that no one, suitably motivated, could reasonably reject.”192
Notable at the outset is that he aims to explain why contract enforcement is justified, i.e., why
the state may be authorized to use its powers in this manner; he does not aim to show that it is
morally compulsory. He begins with the “value of choice,” i.e., “the value for an agent of
having what happens (including what obligations are incurred) depend on how he or she
191
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responds when presented with a set of alternatives under certain conditions.”193 Enforcing
promises which are intended to be legally enforceable obligations194 is a way of advancing
the value of choice. Although he agrees with the common wisdom that promises are binding
and enforceable only if they are voluntary, “choice is voluntary in the relevant sense just in
case the circumstances under which it was made are ones such that no one could reasonably
reject a principle that took choices made under those conditions to create binding (or
enforceable) obligations.”195 Voluntariness is more of a constraint on what is enforceable
than an affirmative let alone dispositive reason why obligations should be enforced. If what
is at issue is the value of choice, it is easy to see as Scanlon himself allows, that the value of
choosing will vary on circumstantial factors. It is a principle that permits state enforcement
in order to promote a value (the value of choice), not a principle that mandates state
enforcement to comply with a principle. Scanlon distinguishes his view from one in which
voluntariness confers moral legitimacy on outcomes.196
Scanlon not only allows that circumstances of choice are relevant to whether
enforcement of a voluntarily assumed obligation well-serves the value of choice, but declines
to specify ex ante what problematic circumstances might be. He maintains that “there is no
simple way to spell out which limits of an agent’s options are objectionable” or “what
constitutes ‘adequate’ access to information about one’s situation.”197

Instead, “the

‘voluntariness’ of an action under given conditions depends on whether it would be
reasonable to reject a principle that attached certain moral consequences to a choice under
those circumstances, and this depends in turn on the claims of others as well as those of the
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agent in question.”198 Scanlon does not see the question of voluntariness as “in general a
question of distributive justice,” but specifically avoids “absolutist conclusions.”199 Indeed,
he specifically eschews the “special moral status” often assigned to choice, showing how it
can have moral significance without dominating other values.200
One of the distinctive aspects of Scanlon’s view is precisely his ability to account for
the significance of voluntariness and choice without proving too much. He does not push on
choice and voluntariness until he arrives at a picture of contract that leaves no room for
considerations that may not animate each aspect of contract doctrine, but nonetheless inform
its proper application. Melvin Eisenberg offers a distinct but also pluralistic take on the
values which underlie contract. He rejects the bargain theory of contract as too dogmatic in
favor of a flexible approach that makes it easier both to admit the enforceability of promise
but also to decline enforcement where appropriate.

“The purposes behind enforcing

promises… are too rich and varied to be captured by a single theory.”201
Eisenberg implies that the alternative to incorporating multiple values into contract
adjudication is a lack of transparency. Where courts felt restricted in their reference to
equitable norms, they “decided issues of fairness covertly, and expressed their decisions
through the manipulation of rules and exceptions purportedly designed for other ends.”202
Now courts may more openly refuse enforcement on grounds of unconscionability.203 More
generally, he argues, “[t]he principles governing the enforceability of promises should be
based on the nature of the injury to the promisee, the presence of independent state policies,
the likelihood of deliberativeness, and the ease of administration.”204 Because Eisenberg
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declines to deduce the rules of contract interpretation and enforcement from a single value,
and because he accommodates the significance of a range of facts that are implicated by the
circumstances of contract, his account suggests an imperfect view of contract.
Dori Kimel offers still another example of a sophisticated view of contract that can be
described as imperfect along the lines specified here. Like a number of pure theorists, he too
would hold that “a central part of the justification for facilitating and enforcing contracts is
the recognition of the value of voluntarily undertaken obligations.”205 The institution of
contract has this in common with the institution of promise, but they serve that value
differently and different rules appropriately apply. The common voluntary character of
obligation does not dictate a common structure to that obligation.206 In particular, contract
doctrine is importantly shaped by the harm principle, which derives from principles of
political freedom rather than principles specific to either promise or contract.207
But Kimel does not suggest that the harm principle explains all important dimensions
of contract any more than the value of voluntary obligations. Contract, on his view, is the
“the legal equivalent of agreement” and “[a]greement is a moral institution, the limits of
which – if you like, the limits on the freedom of which – are delineated by the entirety of
moral considerations that have a bearing on the question of what agreement it is desirable or
at least permissible, for people to make, as well as under what conditions.”208 By facilitating
contracting parties’ pursuit of various ends, “the law is implicated in the moral quality of the
agreements it recognizes and enforces in a particularly direct and active way.”209 Kimel is
thus concerned less with whether the law may legitimately refuse to enforce certain contract
terms and more with “how far the freedom of contract must extend in the first place; what
205
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kinds of transactions the law of contract ought to facilitate, and why.”210 Those questions, he
argues, must be answered on a case-by-case basis.211 Contract law affects many forms of
human flourishing, and ensuring that its effect is ultimately a positive one requires assessing
the background circumstances of any given type of transaction as well as its effects.212
This small sampling of imperfect theories of contract demonstrates two points. First,
imperfect theories do not necessarily see contract as a free form amalgamation of rules
without rhyme or reason. Allowing for the relevance of multiple values does not preclude
associating contract with one value in particular. Each imperfect theory of contract has its
own account of why and how a range of values factors into contract interpretation and would
assign facts about contractual process and context a specific role. Albeit in different ways,
those facts determine for each theory whether the process by which a given set of contracts
has been created renders those agreements worthy of deference, and how much. Second,
imperfect theories are not alike. Some bear a family resemblance to pure theories of contract
in their emphasis on the distinctive value of voluntary obligation; others find the analogy to
private promise misleading. What they have in common is that they allow that courts may
either impose liability for breach of obligations that a party did not specifically intend to
assume, or decline to enforce contract terms under an open-ended range of circumstance.
IV. Conclusion
This Article has had two aims. First, I have offered a model of contract formation in
which two central presumptions of the classical model do not hold true. In parallel contract,
parties do not set or understand their obligations to one another solely by reference to their
communications or dealing with each other. The party in a position to determine their
respective obligations does so by way of acts and words directed at numerous individuals. As
210
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with contracts of adhesion, parallel contract is not robustly dyadic in the way present default
rules presume.
Second, as relational theory suggests is sometimes the case, parties to parallel contract
do not take their respective obligations to be fully determined at the moment of contract
formation. The terms agreed upon at the start of the contractual relationship comprise an
initial agreement; but they do not amount to an “original agreement” which parties amend
only through new and separate moments of contract.
Parallel contract demonstrates that details pertaining to contract formation are relevant
to the appropriate norms of contract adjudication. The second aim of this Article has been to
excavate the deep reasons why some theories of contract would resist such a conclusion. I
have proposed a typology of contract theory that roughly tracks John Rawls’ distinctions
between pure, perfect and imperfect theories of procedural justice. In pure theories of
contract, a single value related to promise or consent justifies enforcement of contract.
Perfect theories are characterized by confidence regarding the ability of normal contractual
processes to meet an exogenous normative standard, like efficiency or welfare-maximization.
Theories of contract as imperfect tend to accommodate a range of values and are therefore
less likely to see contract as invariably achieving an optimal balance among the values
implicated; some of those values turn on outcomes and are underserved by the rigidities of
contract law today.
Contract law today is already sprawling – it includes a common law that allows for
some specialized rules for particular contractual circumstances, as well as many statutory
regimes that apply rules specific to various contractual contexts.213 As a pragmatic matter,
the interpretive reforms called for here could be achieved through employment legislation
213
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(and legislation tailored to other situations where parallel contract may prevail) or reform on
the margin, by way of small adjustments to the rules of interpretation in case law.
There is no doubt that attempting to tailor rules to variations in the contractual process
is costly; if it were not, we might be tempted to take into account all the details of process
behind each individual contract, and no one is proposing that. Contract law cannot be
completely tailored.214 But nor can it be (or has it been) completely general.215 When
recognized law is too general, judges are prone to contorting contract law by overextending
open-ended doctrines like unconscionability, duty of good faith, and promissory estoppel.
The processes by which contracts are created are too diverse in fact and normative import to
warrant a universal law of contract. Parallel contract is one repeat form of contracting that is
distinct and frequent enough to warrant special treatment.
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